Abstract
ABSTRACT China’s ambitious plan for reducing carbon emissions may have a significant impact on its economy and impose an increased cost burden on the public. Conventionally, governments endure political costs when implementing unpopular policies. How can China achieve its goal without causing political risks? In this paper, we argue that China can promote its costly carbon policy through nationalist propaganda that points to international competition. Using an online survey experiment and an ethnographic study, we find that although nationalist propaganda does not increase public support for the policy, it successfully mitigates the political costs by increasing the respondents’ political trust and motivating them to defend the government against criticism. Furthermore, such nationalist narratives do not reduce public support for international cooperation. This study provides insights into how China solicits support for its ambitious yet costly environmental policies. More broadly, this study reveals how autocrats can use propaganda to promote costly policies.
Published Version
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