Persecuting Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union as an Attempt of Destroying the Russia’s Eurasian Mission: An Example of Grigory Dolya and St Transfiguration Temple in Lednoe

The article is devoted to the historically determined process of closing of Sloboda-Ukrainian monasteries of the Belgorod diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church during the so-called secularization reform of the 18th century in the Russian Empire. The general historical context of church secularization in Russia in the 18th century is analyzed. It is shown that Russian secularization was a logical consequence of establishment of state control over church, which was done by Peter I. Church became an integral part of the state apparatus of Russia. Since then, state intervention in church affairs has became a legal norm. In fact, the power over the Russian Orthodox Church was concentrated in the emperor’s hands. Given the strengthening of the absolutist imperial power under Catherine II, any struggle of church against the state church became hopeless. Thus, the Russian secularization reform of the 18th century actually turned out to be persecution of the church. It is noted that with the loss of independence by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its transfer by the Patriarch of Constantinople Dionysius IV to the Moscow Patriarchs, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became trapped between the hammer and the anvil of state-church opposition in Russia. The author sought to show that the events of the second half of the 80s of the 18th century during the closure of the Sloboda-Ukrainian monasteries were closely related to the general situation of the enslaved Ukrainian lands within the Russian Empire. The destruction of the Orthodox monastic environment of the Sloboda Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna) concerned not only the church life. It directly affected the basics of the Ukrainian colonization of the “Wild Field” lands. According to the author, the Ukrainians made not only a military and economic contribution to the development of the future of Sloboda Ukraine during the colonization of the “Wild Field” lands, but also a spiritual and religious one. The author states that it completed the institutionalization of the concept of “Ukrainian Slobozhanshchyna”. The article states that in 1786–1788 the secularization measures were extended to the Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire. The peculiarity of the religious life of Slobozhanshchyna at that time was that it was administratively subject to management by the Belgorod bishops. Despite this subordination to the ROC, certain Ukrainian peculiarities in the organization of life and ritual were preserved in the Sloboda-Ukrainian lands. The secular and ecclesiastical authority of the empire sought to eliminate this difference. The policy of secularization of the suburban monasteries with their massive closures was intended to establish complete uniformity in the Orthodox-religious sphere throughout the empire. In 1787 the Russian authorities began to close the Sloboda-Ukrainian monasteries of the Belgorod diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. The closure of the Sloboda-Ukrainian monasteries was accompanied by a sharp reduction in the number of Orthodox monasteries on the territory of the Ukrainian Slobozhanshchyna with a simultaneous sharp decrease in the number of monks. As a result of the secularization reform of the Russian model, the monastic life of Slobozhanshchyna was almost destroyed. The leading Orthodox monasteries of the region did not escape the closure either. Due to confisc ated monastic property, the Russian treasury was replenished with land, crafts and considerable finances. As in the Russian lands, in Slobozhanshchyna enhanced state control over monastic life was provided, more strict church orders were established and the remnants of Ukrainian Orthodox traditions were destroyed.Keywords: Sloboda Ukraine, monasteries, secularization, orthodoxy, church, state, power

Relations between Orthodox Christians in Ukraine in the Context of the War Andriy Dudchenko (bio) This article is about the Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine in the context of the war begun by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Orthodoxy in Ukraine is represented now by two main jurisdictions: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). First some statistics OCU is an autocephalous Church, created at the Unification Council in St. Sophia Cathedral of Kyiv on December 15, 2018. On January 6, 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew granted this Church the Tomos of autocephaly. In OCU there are now 60 bishops, about 7,700 parishes and 4,900 priests, and about 80 monasteries. Before the war, 24.1% of Ukrainians considered themselves members of the OCU, which amounts to 39.8% of Orthodox Ukrainians.1 UOC is a self-governing Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. UOC has 104 bishops, about 12,000 parishes and about the same number of priests, and over 250 monasteries (these figures include the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia before the current war). Before the war, 13.3% of Ukrainians identified themselves as members of the UOC, or 21.9% of Orthodox Ukrainians. To complete the picture, it should be added that 21.9% of respondents, or 36.2% of Orthodox, called themselves "just Orthodox" not identifying with either jurisdiction. As you can see, the number of parishes [End Page 189] and monasteries was much larger in the UOC, but OCU had far more worshippers. On the other hand, according to the data from the same research, UOC had twice as many permanent parishioners as OCU, that is, those who participate in liturgy at least once a week. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has made a huge difference. According to an Omnibus Info Sapiens poll,2 73% of believers in the UOC, Moscow Patriarchate, have ceased to identify themselves with this church. As early as March, the number of supporters of the UOC-MP for the first time fell to a record low of 4%. At the same time, the percentage of OCU supporters increased to 52%. The survey was conducted even before the data on the atrocities of the Russian invaders near Kyiv were published. On May 27, 2022, at a council in Feofaniya, the UOC announced that it is breaking all ties with Moscow Patriarchate, but did not proclaim autocephaly. The canonical status of this Church today needs to be clarified, as I will discuss later on. In addition to the two main jurisdictions, the Kyiv Patriarchate again exists in Ukraine. This jurisdiction was self-dissolved on the day of the Unification Council in 2018 and fully joined the OCU. However, in the summer of 2019, Bishop Filaret Denisenko convened a Local Council, at which he announced the revival of the Kyiv Patriarchate with himself as patriarch, and he began to consecrate new bishops. The OCU, which considers Filaret a bishop with the title of "Honorary Patriarch," called the new consecrations of bishops in the Kyiv Patriarchate non-canonical and stated that they would not be recognized by the OCU. Today there are 14 bishops in the Kyiv Patriarchate, but only a few parishes within the borders of Ukraine.3 A little background Many believers in Ukraine remember the times when there was only one Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union—the Russian Church, also known as the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1989, the revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church or UAOC was proclaimed in Lviv. By the beginning of 1990, about 200 parishes had moved to the UAOC, mainly in western Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church at the time was then-Metropolitan Filaret. He sharply criticized the new autocephalous church, which he [End Page 190] interpreted as a schism. In October of the same year the Ukrainian Exarchate of Moscow Patriarchate was transformed into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.4 Metropolitan Filaret received the title of His Beatitude. In the Blessed Charter issued by Patriarch Alexiy of Moscow, the UOC was called "independent and self-governed in its administration," united with the universal Church through the...

The article offers an analysis of the anti-war rhetoric of the primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The examples popular in the media of the negative perception of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and, accordingly, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in their attitude to the war are questioned. Verification of such receptions is carried out by analyzing the most important provisions of the social doctrines of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. We are talking about the "Basic Social Concept of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" and "For the Life of the World. On the way to the social ethos of the Orthodox Church". It also reveals the features of the attitude of the primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The issue of motivation of those appeals of the leaders of the Churches, in which the features of their attitude to the current Russian-Ukrainian war are revealed, is clarified in detail. Examples of the actions of the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine are given, which are considered in the perspective of radicalization of the official positions of both Churches. It is generalized about the similarity of the official positions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in their attitude to the war as to evil and violence. However, based on the analysis of the anti-war rhetoric of the primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, it is argued that it is problematic perception of war by them as absurd.

The article explores the functioning of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It highlights the unique position of the UOC, which finds itself at the intersection of various political centers' interests and faces pressure both from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian government. The article presents the process of current internal changes within the UOC and their consequences, such as complete separation from the Russian Orthodox Church and extensive humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians affected by armed conflicts. The dynamics of the relationship between the UOC and the Ukrainian government are discussed, as well as the current state of these relations. The article discusses the reasons why the church seeks independence and thoroughly analyzes the new Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The new statute reflects the need for a more flexible structure, enabling the UOC to make its own decisions without external influence. This step has caused dissatisfaction within the Russian Orthodox Church, which considers the UOC as its canonical territory. The informal pressure on the UOC from the Russian Orthodox Church is also described and analyzed in the article. Additionally, the article thoroughly examines the complex relationship between the UOC and the Ukrainian government, often characterized by tension. In some cases, the Ukrainian authorities resort to unlawful methods of pressuring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, drawing criticism from believers, foreign journalists, and politicians. One of the key parts of the article is the analysis of legislative initiatives concerning the UOC. In the current political climate in Ukraine, there have been initiatives aimed at limiting the role of the UOC or even excluding it from society. The article examines the content of these bills and their potential consequences for religious freedom. Overall, the article provides a comprehensive study of the current situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war. It emphasizes the need to understand the intricate relationships between the UOC, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian government to present readers with an objective picture of events and their implications for believers and society as a whole.

Background. This article analyses the legal grounds for the termination of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra National Preserve rent contract between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the National Preserve "Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra". The article evaluates the degree of interference of the government in the church dealings. On the basis of the documents that regulate the legal affairs between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the National Preserve "Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra", this article gives the analysis of the points of view and interests of all parties involved – an appeal of the contractual parties, the degree of interference of the government and of the potential international resonance. Methods. Various research methods were employed to achieve the study's objectives. The quantitative legal method was used to analyse legal norms within Ukrainian legislation, including presidential decrees, provisions in the rent contract, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's charter. Additionally, the analysis method facilitated the examination of the Constitution and relevant legislation of Ukraine, especially regarding martial law provisions. The synthesis method integrated diverse legal perspectives and government stances to unify the author's research on the legality of contract termination and the extent of government intervention in religious freedom, culminating in a cohesive article. Results. A thorough study brought results that testify against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. State bodies' activities and decisions allow us to clearly follow the course of events surrounding the National Reserve "Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra". Conclusions. As a result of the study, the following conclusions were made: after the adoption of the presidential decree on restrictions on the activities of religious organizations affiliated with the aggressor country on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has tried to declare its independence from the Russian Orthodox Church by changing the texts of its vital documents. However, the examination carried out by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience and the countless actions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's priests clearly indicates the presence of canonical and monetary connections between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. Termination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's contract for the rent of the premises of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was initiated by the state authorities of Ukraine on legal grounds. The restrictions applied to parishioners and priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are justified and correspond to the conditions of martial law and are not evidence of excessive state interference in freedom of religion. The presence of international resonance regarding this case is explained by the involvement in the information campaign of a wide network of Russian and pro-Russian information resources, which often manipulate the opinions of people who are not familiar with the legal grounds of the case or are not legally experienced enough.

Background: One of the main characteristics of the Ukrainian religious field is conflict between two large Orthodox Churches – Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). These Churches embrace most part of orthodox population and it makes their conflict potentially dangerous for society. The Russian invasion February 24, 2022 makes many problems for UOC because it is considered to be part of state-depending Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, many believers turned their backs on this church, and the state changed its politics toward it rather harshly. But the extent of the changes in belonging to this church remains uncertain and requires assessment. Purpose: To assess the changes in mass self-identification with Ukrainian Orthodox Church in condition of Russia-Ukraine war. Methods: The analysis of statistical data of the moving of religious community in Ukrainian religious field and analysis of data of confessional identification in national representative public opinion polls. Results: Data of public opinion polls show that on the level of identification with the UOC a significant impact was made by large-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 only. Only in the polls in 2022 there was a significant decrease in the corresponding figure. However, the level of such identification has remained stable even in the situations of the Russian aggression of 2014-2021. Conclusion: Data of public opinion polls show that the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 has significantly influenced the adherence to and the orientation of the UOC. But at the same time, assessments of such changes, which are making on the confessional identification in these surveys, may be somewhat overstated, and they should be treated with great caution, especially if you base on them a politics in such dangerous area as religion. The UOC has been facing powerful challenges for many years. These challenges have dramatically increased since February 24, 2022, but even now this Church has shown considerable sustainability and the issue of halting of its functioning remains quite conflict-prone, while the benefits from its closing seem rather doubtful. Keywords: confessional identification, confessionals changes, Russian aggression, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Ukraine

This essay explores two issues and presents two proposals concerning the current problems in relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC, previously under Moscow), and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). It argues that the issues separating them originated in the turbulent years of 1917–21 and shaped the historical memories of both the UOC and OCU. The two churches are reluctant to take steps toward reconciliation because of the bitterness of historical memory. The paper also explores the lack of pastoral response to the Russian Orthodox Church’s support for the war by other Orthodox churches. It concludes with two proposals. The first is for the UOC, OCU, and other Orthodox churches to draw from the Orthodox liturgical and spiritual traditions of forgiveness and reconciliation and begin a process of healing by sharing Eucharistic communion together. The second proposal is for the other Orthodox churches to create a new mechanism that expedites the process of hearing appeals and adjudicating accusations against Orthodox church leaders – in this case, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is historically and ecclesiastically affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014. The paper specifically discusses legal measures taken by the state against the UOC, focusing on the 2024 law banning the UOC for its affiliation with Russia. The paper demonstrates that, while restrictions applied against the UOC are usually discussed and evaluated within the framework of religious freedom and national security, in fact these restrictions have more to do with the “spiritual decolonization” or “spiritual liberation” of Ukraine, including the de-Russification of Ukrainian religious space. The paper argues that, while the Ukrainian state enjoys broad discretion to protect national security, the ban on UOC communities that are not involved in illegal activities can hardly be reconciled with international standards of freedom of religion or belief, which consequently weakens rather than strengthens Ukraine’s security. The ban is also potentially problematic for Ukraine’s religious pluralism, as it will unduly strengthen state interference in religious life and unavoidably result in state favouritism for the UOC’s rival church, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The author explores the relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) after the latter received the tomos of autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2019. This paper provides a brief analysis of the interactions between the UGCC and the Orthodox churches in Ukraine before 2018 with a focus on the ecumenical dimension of their relations. It also assesses the UGCC’s reactions to the process of the OCU being granted autocephaly, as well as events around a Greek-Catholic initiative to hold a solemn service in the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, which caused tensions between the two churches. The research reveals a certain dependency between the UGCC and the OCU based upon the previous trajectory of the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainian relationship, alongside the emergence of some new factors that have influenced their relations.

In July 2009 Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus' paid a visit to Ukraine with ostensibly spiritual concerns to celebrate the anniversary of the baptism of St Vladimir and Rus' and the 450th anniversary of the gift of the Pochaiv icon of the Mother of God. In this article we argue that the visit was, however, of more than just pastoral significance: it served both symbolically and realistically as a means to shore up the relationship between the Ukrainian Orthodox and Russia, reinforcing the religious and political ties between the two countries. We also argue that in backing up these ties, Kirill will not allow the formation of an independent and unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the motherland of Russian Orthodoxy, thus perpetuating the schism that exists between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). As a result, Ukraine is left without a unified church to promote union among the people, Russians and Ukrainians, something which was desired by President Viktor Yuschenko. This strategy by Kirill may cause further complications in inter-Orthodox relations, especially with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which desires a resolution to the non-canonical situation in Ukraine.

The article analyses the current situation in Ukrainian Orthodoxy that developed during the Russian-Ukrainian war. War exacerbated the existing confrontation between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, between church and state. The attitude of society, the state, and the churches to the intra-Orthodox conflict is extremely polarized. The escalation of the crisis is accompanied by the absence of a unified position of the churches, the state, and society on the issues of war. Relations between the State and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have deteriorated significantly. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not engage in dialogue with the authorities, accusing them of persecuting the Orthodox faith and institutions. Society is waiting for an adequate conflict resolution between church and state, between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Article history: Received 30.01.2023; Revised 12.02.2023; Accepted 19.02.2023. Available online: 07. 06. 2023. Available print: 30. 06. 2023

The article clarifies the role of the leading Orthodox institutions of Ukraine – the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – in the conditions of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. It was noted that the war became a powerful catalyst for the national identification and civilizational choice of the institutions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the positions of which were finally polarized by the full-scale invasion of Russian troops.It was concluded that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the conditions of war sees its role primarily in the continuous supply of chaplains for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They perform the functions of meeting the spiritual and religious needs of Ukrainian soldiers, providing them with the necessary supplies, and social and psychological assistance. The church provides charitable assistance to Ukrainian families whose homes were destroyed by the occupiers. The social initiative of the Foundation of Metropolitan Epiphany regarding the construction of temporary housing for residents of the Kyiv region is aimed at this.The presentation of Ukrainian autocephaly in the world was the representation of the OCU in the assembly of the World Council of Churches in October 2022, which was strengthened by the resolution condemning Russian aggression.The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate takes an ambiguous position regarding the war. The environment of this institution became significantly polarized with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russian troops. On the one hand, its hierarchs in the East and South of Ukraine support the invasion of Russian troops and mobilization, fake referendums, and actively collaborate with the occupiers. At the same time, another part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is trying to clearly and unambiguously distance itself from the Russian Orthodox Church. The group of archpriest Andrii Pinchuk, who became one of the initiators of collecting signatures for an international church tribunal against Patriarch Kirill. In order to stop the split in the Church, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate adopted a decision on "independence and independence" from the Russian Church. Analyzing the decisions of the Council, the leaders of the Orthodox Church ofUkraine commented on them as a "smoke screen", in fact a mimicry of independence from the Russian Orthodox Church.

The factors of ethnicity and religion are the foundation of the national identity as seen across the peoples of our planet. Amid the russian war against Ukraine, the factors behind the formation and reinforcement of national identity have gained particular importance. Among those, religion occupies a distinct role; hence, in the modern age of cutting-edge scientific and technological advances of humanity, religion continues to have a colossal impact on virtually every facet of the functioning of society. Therefore, national identity also constitutes a potent driving force behind all social processes: politics, economy, culture, and, ultimately, warfare. That is why the national identity of the Ukrainian people as a whole and every individual Ukrainian is so vital and valuable. Ukraine faces an extraordinary threat emanating from religious organisations with headquarters in the territory of the aggressor state, russia. It is especially true in the case of the moscow patriarchate (MP), functioning in Ukraine under the designation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). Meanwhile, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was one of the first to appeal to the international community and world religious leaders to help stop russian armed aggression. The OCU also disseminates truthful information about Ukraine, primarily abroad, through the channels of church diplomacy. Strengthening the identity of the Ukrainian nation and elimination of the imperial religious and ideological influence of the MP and russian eurasianism should be one of the priorities of the state security policy of Ukraine. Keywords: Ukraine, russian aggression, OCU, tomos, UOC.

The purposes of this article are to highlight on the basis of the epistolary legacy of Hetman Ivan Mazepa his relationship with the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy, the main directions, ways and methods of helping the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to follow determine certain directions of Hetman I. Mazepa's activity in relation to the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands, on the basis of his epistolary heritage, which was aimed at comprehensive assistance to the church; to establish the main directions of his help and the ways in which Hetman helped the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy. The article analyzes a certain part of the epistolary heritage of Hetman I. Mazepa. The set of letters used in the study makes it possible to trace the main trends in the relations of Hetman I. Mazepa with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church during his reign. It was found that most of the studied and analyzed letters of Hetman I. Mazepa to various representatives of the Orthodox clergy and some representatives of the Cossack officers speak of comprehensive support of the Orthodox Church in Ukrainian lands (benefits, material assistance, protection of Ukrainian Orthodox clergy at the political level, etc. e.). The letters also clearly show the tendency that Hetman I. Mazepa tried to make the Orthodox Church one of his main pillars for consolidating his power (it is clearly traced in the letters dated to the first years of his reign).

This article examines and analyzes the discriminatory processes in Ukraine against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the discriminatory processes in the European Union countries against the Russian Orthodox Church. It specifi es the major publications highlighting the facts of discrimination against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The article also mentions the documents of the European Parliament, which have been used as the justifi cation for restricting the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church. These documents have become an aid for the introduction of unprecedented targeted sanctions against Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia by countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Such gross interference by politicians in the activity of Orthodox churches is becoming the norm of political life in countries such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as evidenced by the actions taken by the politicians of these countries and mentioned in the article. Moreover, the article fi gures out the understanding of the crisis in the international human rights movement with regard to rights and freedoms of religious organizations. The article highlights cases when Ukrainian human rights defenders became authors of anti-church laws, and the well-known Amnesty International human rights organization apologized for their report on the alleged war crimes by the Zelensky’s regime. Double standards in the assessment of off ense seriousness in Ukraine are clearly illustrated by the example of the fi rst three reports of the Monitoring Mission that was deployed in Ukraine in March 2014 by the Off ice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. This mission was represented by more than 30 employees in fi ve Ukrainian cities: Kyiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Kharkiv and Lviv. These reports included a section dedicated to the observance of rights and freedoms of religious organizations in Ukraine. The article mentions the incidents recorded by the Monitoring Mission and the facts of discrimination against clerics and members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church highlighted in mass media. It is noted that the Monitoring Mission recorded mainly cases of discrimination against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and other religious organizations. Violations of rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were not only ignored, but sometimes its activity was characterized in documents as “aggressive”.