The Beneficial Shock

This article examines Osman Hamdi’s 1888 painting Turkish Street Scene (Alte Nationalgalerie, Berlin) via correspondence acquired from Ottoman and German archives. It aims to contextualize both the painting’s purchase by the Berlin Nationalgalerie and its iconography within German policies toward the Middle East at the time. The author argues that, in correlation with the policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II, Osman Hamdi engaged in power relations with German authorities as the director of Istanbul’s Imperial Museum of Antiquities, creating conditions for the purchase of the painting and the cultivation of his artistic career in the German Empire. The case is made that the painting’s composition manifests a subjectivity in compliance with the prevalent Orientalist discourses reinforcing the hierarchic relations established with the German state.

تتناول هذه الدراسة مکانة وآليات وأدوات القوة الناعمة فى السياسة الروسية الجديدة بمنطقة الشرق الأوسط عموما والمنطقة العربية على وجه الخصوص؛ وحاولت معالجة والتحقق من الافتراض الرئيسى لها وهو : غلبة الترکيز على ابعاد القوة الصلبة العسکرية تحديدا في تدخلات روسيا وادوارها في منطقة الشرق الأوسط والمنطقة العربية؛ وتوظيف السياسة الروسية بالتوازي لأدوات القوة الناعمة في سعيها لتحقيق أهدافها. وعرضت الدراسةملامح تغييرالسياسةالروسيةتجاه قضايا ومشکلات المنطقةالعربية،وذلک من خلال تحليل أهداف السياسة الروسية الجديدة فى المنطقة؛ وأدوات القوة الناعمة التى اعتمدتها روسيا للوصول إلى أهدافها؛ وکذلک تقييم فاعلية کل أداة من هذه الأدوات وبيان أوجه القصور والخلل فيها . وقد تم تقسيم الدراسة لعدة أقسام هى : أولا؛ والذى تضمن تعريف مفهوم القوة الناعمة وتمييزه عن المفاهيم المختلطة به مثل القوة الحادة والقوة الافتراضية أو القوة الإلکترونية والقوة الحيوية . ورصد القسم الثانى من الدراسة أهداف السياسة الروسية الجديدة فى الشرق الأوسط والمنطقة العربية خلال الفترة بين عامى 2012 و2020. وعرض القسم الثالث؛ التصور الروسى لأدوات القوة الناعمة والتى ارتبطت إلى حد بعيد برؤية وأفکار الرئيس الروسى فلاديمير بوتين علاوة على ضغوط البيئتين الدولية والإقليمية وعرض القسم الأخير من الدراسة لتطور مکانة وترتيب روسيا على مقياس القوة الناعمة فى الفترة بين عامى 2016 و2019. وکشفت الخاتمةة عن وجود عدة معوقات وقيود على فعالية أدوات القوة الناعمة للسياسة الروسية الجديدة فى منطقة الشرق الأوسط عموما ومع الدول العربية على وجه الخصوص؛ غير أن السياسة الروسية الجديدة تمکنت من خلال الأستخدام والتوظيف الجيد لأدوات القوة الناعم ةحققت بعض المنجزات التى من أهمها : نجاح أدوات القوة الناعمة لاسيما تلک المتعلقة بجذب وتوطين الاستثمارات المشترکة فى قطاعى الطاقة وصناعة الأسلحة؛ واستعادة الصورة الإيجابية لروسيا لدى الشباب العربى؛ مما يشير إلى نجاح مساعى السياسة الخارجية الروسية فى عهد فلاديمير بوتين في الشرق الأوسط فى إعادة تشکيل مواقف العرب تجاه روسيا بما يعزز من مکانتها کأکبر حليف دولي في المنطقة في الوقت الحاضر والمستقبل القريب. الکلمات الدالة: السياسة الروسية؛ المنطقة العربية؛ القوة الناعمة؛ فلاديمير بوتين؛ الاقتصاد الروسى، مبيعات الأسلحة الروسية . Abstract: This study deals with the status, mechanisms and tools of soft power in the new Russian policy in the Middle East region in general and the Arab region in particular. And it tried to address and verify its main assumption, which is: the predominance of focus on the dimensions of military hard power, specifically in Russia's interventions and roles in the Middle East and the Arab region, but the analysis showed the use of Russian policy in parallel with soft power tools in its pursuit of its goals. The study presented the features and reasons for changing the Russian policy towards the issues and problems of the Arab region, by analyzing and explaining the objectives of the new Russian policy in the region; and soft power tools that Russia has adopted to reach its goals; As well as evaluating the effectiveness of each of these tools and indicating the shortcomings and defects in them. The study was divided into several sections: First; Which included defining the concept of soft power and distinguishing it from concepts mixed with it, such as sharp power and virtual power or electronic power and vital power. The second section of the study monitored the objectives of the new Russian policy in the Middle East and the Arab region during the period between 2012 and 2020. the presentation of the third section; The Russian perception of soft power tools, which is closely related to the vision and ideas of Russian President Vladimir Putin, in addition to the pressures of the international and regional environments. The last section of the study presented the development of Russia’s position and ranking on the soft power scale in the period between 2016 and 2019. The conclusion revealed the existence of several obstacles and restrictions on the effectiveness of the soft power tools of the new Russian policy in the Middle East region in general and with the Arab countries in particular. However, the new Russian policy was able, through the good use of soft power tools, to achieve some achievements, the most important of which are: the success of soft power tools, especially those related to attracting and settling joint investments in the energy and arms industry sectors; restoring the positive image of Russia among Arab youth in contrast to the decline or weakness of the image of the United States in 2015 and 2016, respectively, according to several public opinion polls in some Arab countries; This indicates the success of Russian foreign policy endeavors during the era of Vladimir Putin in the Middle East in reshaping Arab attitudes towards Russia, thus enhancing its position as the largest international ally in the region at present and in the near future. Keywords: Russian politics; the Arab region; soft power; Vladimir Putin ; The Russian economy, Russian arms sales.

Reviewed by: Putin's War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America's Absence by Anna Borshchevskaya, and: Russia Rising: Putin's Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa ed. by Dimitar Bechev, Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru Robert O. Freedman Borshchevskaya, Anna. Putin's War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America's Absence. I. B. Tauris, London, New York and Dublin, 2022. ix + 242 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £20.00; £18.00 (e-book). Bechev, Dimitar; Popescu, Nicu and Secrieru, Stanislav (eds). Russia Rising: Putin's Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa. I. B. Tauris, London, New York and Dublin, 2021. x + 209 pp. Map. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £65.00; £21.99; £19.79 (e-book). The Russian military intervention in Syria in 2015 sparked renewed interest in Russian policy in the Middle East under Vladimir Putin, and these two books, among others, are a result of this. In Putin's War in Syria, Anna Borshchevskaya presents a long history of Russia's involvement in the Middle East, while Bechev, Popescu and Secrieru's edited volume collects a series of essays on different aspects of Russian statecraft in the region, from Russian arms sales to Russia's relations with Israel. Anna Borshchevskaya's book offers a very useful summary of Russian policy in the Middle East which is both very readable and very analytic, as it examines first tsarist, then Soviet and then Russian Federation policy, leading up to Russia's military intervention in Syria in 2015. Borshchevskaya is highly critical of US inaction in the Middle East, particularly former US President Barack Obama's failure to follow through on his threat to use force against the regime of Bashar Assad if it used chemical weapons against its opponents in the Syrian civil war. She also offers a timely reminder of how early tsarist Russia got involved in the Middle East, recounting how Catherine II seized Beriut in 1772 in an effort to pressure the Ottoman Empire. In addition, she recounts the Russian Empire's territorial conquests in Iran in the early part of the nineteenth century, something Iran's current leaders should keep in [End Page 189] mind as they seek closer relations with Moscow. Borshchevskaya also quotes Catherine II's famous comment: 'I have no better way to protect my borders than to extend them' (p. 12) — an argument Putin has similarly used to justify his actions in Georgia and Ukraine. In her discussion of Russia's military intervention in Syria in 2015, Borshchevskaya notes that in addition to preserving the Assad regime, which was facing major difficulties during the Syrian civil war, Russia's goal was to create an 'anti-access/area denial' system to keep NATO out of Syria and strengthen the Russian position in the Mediterranean (p. 72). She also asserts, quite correctly, that in Syria Putin was actively competing with the United States and the West, even if the West did not see it that way (p. 79). In sum, this is a very rich book and one I would strongly recommend for use in college courses on Russian foreign policy. The only area in which I disagree with Borshchevskaya is where she asserts that the Russian armed forces gained valuable experience from their intervention in Syria. It is clear, however, that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has underlined the failures of the Russian military to properly deploy its forces. More importantly, in Syria Russia did not find itself up against a well-armed and well-trained adversary, as in Ukraine, but rather a divided and poorly-armed Syrian opposition. Consequently, the lessons Moscow may have learned from the fighting in Syria were probably the wrong ones. This assertion of the positive military experiences gained by Russia in Syria is also madе — falsely — by a number of contributors to Russia Rising. Thus, in his analysis of Russia's arms exports to the Middle East, Timofey Borisov asserts that '[d]uring its intervention in Syria, Moscow had tested about three hundred new types of weapons and military equipment in real combat conditions' (p. 48). Here again I would ask...

Conventional Wisdom and the Next Unknown

Photo: International Security Assistance Force MediaBerlin—At the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, the President of Germany, Joachim Gauck asked the following key questions:“Has Germany already adequately recognized the new threats and the changing structure of the international order?“Has Germany shown enough initiative to ensure the future viability of the networks of norms, friends, and alliances, which after all brought us peace in freedom and democracy in prosperity?”A moment later he took it upon himself to provide the answers: “Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”His remarks prompted an intensive debate—immediately narrowed to the issue of Germany’s engagement in and contributions to current and future military operations. However, his remarks were meant as a wake-up call designed to start a much broader discussion of Germany’s role and responsibilities in a changing world, taking into account the broad spectrum of the nation’s power and influence.So far, the debate has failed to engage much of the German public. Still, some now understand that our country cannot play a leading role in economic and financial politics within the European Union and beyond, while at the same time remaining more or less an observer when foreign and security politics are at stake.The Ukrainian crisis has clearly brought about a substantial change. Germany has taken the initiative and risks within the so-called Weimar Triangle, a grouping of Poland, Germany, and France, and within the European Union. There, Germany has been trying to define and pursue common positions as prerequisites for any approach toward Russia.The second substantial change was made recently when Germany broke with its long-held policy not to supply lethal weapons to conflict zones. The German government decided to supply weapons to the Kurds in Iraq, in concert with the EU policy on the conflict in northern Iraq. Germany has not only backed the actions of its allies and others, but has taken on its own responsibilities in addressing the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS, which has occupied large parts of Iraq and slaughtered thousands of people.But there is more to be done. Germany, and in particular the German public, has to understand how dependent its own peace, freedom, and prosperity is on this dynamic and changing world. A broad analysis, like the Review 2014 initiated by the German Foreign Office, is needed to define “long lines” of Germany’s role and responsibilities, including goals, interests, instruments, and resources.Since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, foreign and security politics were largely determined by six major factors, which contributed to the re-unification of the country and the overcoming of the divide in Europe. Though times have changed dramatically since then, these factors must be preserved and further developed—taking into account current and future political challenges and concerns.The reconciliation between France and Germany, finalized with the Élysée Treaty of 1963, was an historical achievement. It turned out to be the precondition for the European amalgamation that eventually led to the establishment of the European Union. The Franco-German cooperation as part of this process has been called the “European engine.” When this “engine” was running, Europe made progress. Nothing has changed in this respect—yet. Europe’s political and economic power is located in its center, where France and Germany must develop and pursue the required initiatives for Europe’s future. At the same time, they must take into account the interests of the other EU members and need to cooperate with these countries closely. A core requirement for continuing this approach is that France and Germany perceive themselves as equal partners. Yet there are some doubts stemming largely from Germany’s dominance and France’s weakness in economic terms, as well as German reluctance particularly on matters of defense policy. Both states must strengthen their bilateral political dialogue on these issues, with the goal of continuing to strengthen the “European engine.”It might sound rather contradictory to argue for strengthening the EU while nationalistic movements are becoming stronger in Europe and one important member state, the United Kingdom, is threatening the Union with withdrawal. But it must be emphasized that the European Union actually is a success story, unprecedented in history. It can be an example to other regions on this globe. Moreover, a united Europe is the only answer by the old continent to the new challenges in a dramatically changing world.Only free and united can the EU be an acknowledged global actor, preserving its own interests while also contributing to stability and peace. The economic and financial crisis that debuted in 2007 has clearly demonstrated that Europe as a union is already a global actor. Thus, it’s about time that the EU becomes a global player in the field of what is called the Common Foreign and Security Politics of the Union.First steps have been taken, even in defense policy, but much remains to be done, not as a competitor of the United States, but in concert. Germany, as a leading state within Europe, carries a particular responsibility to move this forward. The Franco-German “engine” must be kept alive—and Europeans should hope that one day the UK will join the two countries in leading in this particular field with all its knowledge, experience, and resources.In the early years of the Federal Republic, the conservative former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer anchored and embedded West Germany into the Western alliance, one of the wisest decisions in modern German history. Today it has become more trying to argue for preserving or even enhancing the transatlantic relationship—with an instinctive American disengagement from Europe, the U.S. “pivot to Asia,” and the growing mistrust due to the NSA spying scandal and other espionage incidents which have even higher visibility in Germany than in the United States. Germans are asking, “Why do they spy on us when they could and should talk to us?” Trust between states and people is of extraordinary political value. This should not be neglected by Americans. German irritations about the United States as a viable partner can have a deep and lasting impact on transatlantic relations.Political ideas or initiatives should normally never be pursued without alternatives. But with respect to good and trusting transatlantic relations, there is no alternative for either the United States or Europe. No conceivable alternative exists for either partner that would allow it to define and pursue common positions—most recently toward Russia in the Ukrainian crisis. We share so many values, and most of our interests are identical. We are partners within the North Atlantic Alliance. Looking at current and future risks and threats, NATO must be strengthened to ensure the security of the U.S. and Europe. In this context, time might be ripe to discuss openly and frankly how freedom and security is to be balanced in this new technological era. Additionally, a debate is essential on a more equal burden sharing between Europe and the United States regarding defense.There are also opportunities for improvement in the field of economic policy. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Program [TTIP] would combine the two strongest economic centers of the world, with advantages for both the United States and the European Union. TTIP would bring more economic growth, more job creation, and better social standards if both sides were willing to compromise. It would also send a clear signal to all other global partners by setting common standards. Furthermore, such a pact could be an impetus to search for additional common solutions in transatlantic relations.With the Ukraine crisis in mind, it might sound strange to argue for a partnership with Russia. But even during the coldest periods of the Cold War, the Western nations kept political contacts alive with Moscow. In the end, the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Willy Brandt contributed very much to the process which tore down the Berlin Wall and overcame the division of Europe. There is no doubt that any kind of partnership policy with President Putin will be difficult. So it is of utmost importance that the United States and the European Union remain united and firmly committed to a common policy toward Russia.Germany must take a leading role in developing this policy within the EU, given its wide-ranging relations with Russia. This includes bearing possible negative effects on its own economy and sharing the necessary burden in military terms. Such a policy may also require patience and endurance if Putin maintains his nationalistic and hegemonic politics. Russia is an essential part of Europe, and thus the Western nations have to deal with this country and maintain communication and consultation based on their own strength and unity.The 1975 Helsinki Charter—the core of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] process—laid the foundation for the beginning of the end of the Soviet regime and the Warsaw Pact. Citizens in Central and Eastern Europe demanded human rights and the rule of law, referring to this Charter, while succeeding in overcoming the unnatural division of Europe. In 1990, all European states, together with the United States and Canada, as well as the still existing Soviet Union, declared the objective of a “Europe whole and free.”A quarter century later the question must be asked if this really has been achieved. Sadly, the Ukrainian crisis provides us with a negative answer. Not all countries are sovereign and independent, and not all people are free and living under the rule of law in democracy and peace, particularly not those in Russia and its neighborhood. What went wrong, and what remains to be done?First, the EU member states, the United States, and Canada must care more in political, economic, and military terms about the states in Eastern Europe, which are neither members of NATO nor the EU. Second, a common Western policy toward and with Russia must be pursued. Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], successor to the CSCE, must be invigorated with a special focus on peace and security.Not until 1973 did both Germanys, the communist East and the free West, become members of the United Nations. After 1990, re-united Germany has always taken an active role within the United Nations and is one of its largest financial contributors. During the last UN reform process, Germany sought, in vain, a permanent seat in the Security Council. Unfortunately, UN structures, especially the Security Council itself, still reflect the world order of 1945. All reform endeavors in this respect have failed, limiting or even impeding efforts and initiatives in the important fields of peace, security, stability, and development. This leads to one of the most serious deficiencies in world politics.Since 2011, the disastrous civil war in Syria has been the prime example. The UN is the only global forum providing the framework for a rule-based international order, including the unique right to legitimize the use of force outside the universal right of self-defense. So strengthening the United Nations and its affiliate organizations, while taking on its national responsibilities within the UN remains an important goal of German foreign policy. At the same time, Germany is fully aware of the fact that improvements can only be achieved in close cooperation with its Western partners and in concert with such other major powers as China, Russia, India, and Brazil.Globalization has created new political, economic, and social networks, which now span the globe. This reality has caused an unprecedented degree of interdependencies, but also vulnerabilities, with profound consequences for Germany and its partners. Germany is more exposed to globalization than many other countries and must therefore consider these interdependencies and their concurrent vulnerabilities in developing its political approaches.This group of rapidly rising nations includes first and foremost China, but also developing countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia. Some share such values as the rule of law and good governance. But many do not see the West as a role model and are reluctant to grant political and social rights and freedoms. The current and probable future focus of these states is on their economic growth, which may generate economic cooperation, but also competition with Western countries, including Germany. The willingness of these rising states to take on responsibilities for peace, security, and stability within the international order is rather limited to their respective regions and mainly aimed at preserving their own interests.In the case of China, an aggressive policy toward its neighbors leads to a continuing state of high tension in East Asia, where a balancing policy of the United States in support of these neighboring countries is of utmost importance. However, even this cannot guarantee peace in that region. Any conflict there would have serious global implications. Inevitably, these polycentric developments will lead to competition, even to conflicts by the new economic and political powers with the West. A concerted Western policy, which combines engagement where possible, and containment where necessary, must be further developed. The EU and Germany need to play an active role. The best case scenario should lead to a new architecture of the international order with these new powers appropriately represented, while preventing the formation of new blocks.At the same time, the international community is faced with too many fragile or failed states. In all too many such nations, what begins as an internal conflict quickly spills over to neighbors, quite often engulfing an entire region. In a globalized world, a local problem can quickly develop into a regional, even international crisis. However, it becomes a problem when the regional, even international community is not engaged early enough and proactively. During the last two decades’ crises, conflicts, even wars in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia offer clear evidence that the international community acted or reacted too late, or worse yet, not at all.Conflict prevention is the catchphrase. It requires the willingness of political leaders and their voters to act in a timely fashion by using all instruments required, if necessary also military means, to end and resolve a conflict. With the experience of less successful military engagements in the last decade and conscious of their reduced resources, the United States and Europe do feel exhausted regarding any further international involvement. However, when analyzing political, economic, and social fragility in many countries, largely within the European neighborhood, it seems high time to develop a renewed common and comprehensive policy on conflict prevention. In concert with a global American policy, the EU, and therefore Germany as one of its leading states, has a particular responsibility for preserving peace and security in and for Europe by using its wide range of instruments.Globalization has accelerated the privatization and individualization of violence in its major forms of terrorism and organized crime. Fragile or failed states combined with political and religious extremism nurture both. However, the negative effects of terrorism and organized crime spill over to other nations and regions with profound implications for internal security. The situation is worsening due to the fact that terror organizations are occupying and controlling entire geographical areas, sometimes across state borders, such as Hamas in Gaza, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Military operations alone cannot resolve these problems. In many cases they may even generate more hatred, especially if Western states get involved.There is no simple answer on how to deal with such threats. What is required is an internationally agreed upon, comprehensive political approach employing all instruments of diplomacy, economic, and development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and decisive military action, if necessary, with the main effort directed toward the suffering local population. Furthermore, close cooperation with reliable local and regional authorities and organizations is imperative. At least, good governance and economic and social welfare at an appropriate level have the effect of eradicating the influence of extremists. Only the United States and the EU are able and also obliged to pursue such a policy due to their political, economic, and military capabilities, but more due to their to universal like human freedom, and for organized with its in and weapons and the are mainly to be in fragile and failed states. But the of of our own is and many with the opportunities of and their and by so or even the and of the West as a role model for the rule of law and can only be with and and with an and better international cooperation of and to the known states, at other countries have the to join the in a rather Such a would make this world a much more to The permanent members of the UN Security Council Germany, in Europe the with the should be in this broader a weapons state, it would not only the Middle East but a new with implications for security on a global the of the this reality is also by and The United States, the EU, and the European France, and Germany, have to Russia and on and toward an with during the with is an essential a for a successful of the Treaty in This is still a and fragile of international and additional by states may be during this and may even be But its is of utmost importance to global security and and the are still with on the consequences of the change. and is too many have turned a to this some out of to their economic We all the effects on the and our but there is still a reluctance in too many parts of the world, including the West, to consider the and consequences and take the necessary steps the required are not in a years will all be exposed to much more serious risks stemming from living will be by and and in some countries, or at some parts of will have from this as a of rising This all will have political, economic, and humanitarian with an important security and many other states have to act in a timely and appropriate addressing their challenges with national initiatives and But solutions are essential on a global It is important that a new UN be for in The United States and the EU should play an active and decisive part in this process, and both should do possible to and the developing influence internal politics in countries and while foreign and security policy on a global that is only to in importance. Looking only to years on should to be taken into The United States will maintain its current while Europe’s may to might change this to a will but will be with social stemming from an caused by the In the of and the world will within the with under the of question is the and nations will be in a to provide their people with a future. the question of how much the West is able and willing to support these might is to in the and therefore neighborhood. The current crisis in the with humanitarian may provide us with a first of what may be at if our focus to all of North and Africa, as well as the Middle East, many states with economic, and social structures, which social and of which can only be within the to their close the EU, with Germany as a leading but also must define and to and support in close cooperation with these states. Such an approach also requires the engagement of the United States, the rising nations, and the more such initiatives are a for preserving our own freedom, and internal and must be recognized as a and is all of our Looking it seems to be that have not the effects of this new to the necessary, and will need more time to get a on the provides us with a of never known and with opportunities of never Furthermore, has strengthened and the by providing to and and more to So networks new risks and threats to our security are security is the for states, their and including the for and as well as the other an of and opportunities for never This can be with negative impact by and but also for impact like in political and social and the global community are with important such as how to our and human how to ensure the security of our and how to both in this Germany and all other states are only in a to national with rather limited impact as networks So global solutions are necessary and a first a framework with is essential within the The United States carries particular responsibilities on by of its dominance in this Still, and between and Europeans are necessary to on important between freedom and security of our leading to a common transatlantic which could the to a global and their are by values and conflicts in this polycentric world. states with political on the are by where a group the many countries, particularly some rising nations, are this In this is clearly an while Russia seems in this these states or these political to others, in the case of due to their economic What about the of our own Western values and of comprehensive of the Western model and its impact on the of our might some important and Europeans are fully committed to human civil rule of law, and political However, globalization and the economic crisis have negative effects on our states and their have become more social more All of us within the EU should be about the reality that as many as the in EU states are or do not have a to there are the of a of and in our Western We should not the that modern are to or to to the the Europeans and must strengthen our common values and our of by even more and to our with all and economic and provide our particularly our with future this is at it provides us with the instruments and the to for these values and our of in our foreign policy. in and will the competition on and to a better and a of foreign and security challenges that most other states, and especially its Western in this globalized world. therefore to define for Germany, which might be also to the foreign and security of other first could be called the of No state, neither Germany nor other European states nor the United States as the only remaining global can act on its All nations have largely their The and the of in international and the role of the national state in must be We are to an end of the of when the first were created in the European under a of of In the of solutions require In this the European Union might the political example for other states and for Germany, has been and will remain a second for the end of any are to be with for the others, or as the world the of This should to the whole spectrum of political There may be some leaders to this But they will be the future President Putin may to be the first Western states, Germany must not standards in their Any approach and should be fully with the values for which they this a call for a foreign and security policy, the It is that conflicts may between values and interests, especially with states, or even Unfortunately, there are too many particularly to security interests, where Western states, including their military failed to their own values and with international This must be changed if are to and our and that the West is to its own values and is reliable in foreign and security policy requires a comprehensive approach from the economic, and especially military will to resolve any in terms of conflict crisis or peace This requires us to on clear and political by an intensive and cooperation aimed at between the on national and international to Germany. Germany was a of a security by NATO and especially the United States. The re-united Germany, due to its and especially its economic must more Germany to to the of international policy and to become a security In this the narrowed internal German which on Germany’s military is more is Germany must play a aimed at common with others, and for within the EU, and the has never been as and free as it is Germans take this reality for and these times will last Yet our freedom, security, and prosperity are dependent on Europe and the world as a and our responsibilities, and as a member of the international community must be by our policy and and military Joachim this process at the Munich Security Conference last However, much more must be if our are to understand and what it to to the stability of the international With the at which international are a by leading countries like Germany to and more decisively is essential if are to peace and security for and for

Russian under President Vladimir Putin has established a strong presence in the Middle East. In fact, in 2017, Russian involvement in the regional affairs is more pronounced. Putin has done his utmost to restore Russia’s prestige in the region and has been successful to an extent. Russia though for a brief period lost out to the USA, especially in the case of Iraq and Libya but its decisive intervention in Syria has changed the dynamics. If one compares the policies followed by the Soviet Union in the Middle East during the reigns of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev to the present situation some interesting parallels can be drawn. However, it should be noted that the goals and policies pursued by Putin are entirely different. But in comparing the position of Russia in the Middle East under Putin to the Soviet position in the region under Khrushchev and Brezhnev is much stronger.

In the twenty-five years after 1989, the world enjoyed the deepest peace in history. To be sure, wars took place in this era, but less frequently and on a far smaller scale than in previous periods. The peace ended because three major countries – Vladimir Putin’s Russia in Europe, Xi Jinping’s China in East Asia, and the Shia clerics’ Iran in the Middle East – put an end to it with aggressive nationalist policies aimed at overturning the prevailing political arrangements in their respective regions. The three leaders had a common motive: their need to survive in a democratic age with their countries’ prospects for economic growth uncertain. The key to the return of peace lies in the advent of genuine democracy, including free elections and the protection of religious, economic, and political liberty. Recent history has shown, however, that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, leading to a paradox: the world has a formula for peace, but the world has no way to put it into practice.

This chapter addresses visual representations of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in relation to the idea of home. The visual art it considers presents a cultural site rather than a political and legal one; a borderland where the naval base and eastern Cuba are united both territorially and creatively; and a space of complex conceptual geographies, where Cuba, the Caribbean, the U.S., the Middle East, and Europe converge. Works by photographer Edmund Clark from his series Guantanamo: If the Lights Go Out and ‘El camino de la estrategia,’ a multimedia project by Cuban artists Alexander Beaton and Pedro Gutierrez, among other visual representations, counter the geographic abstraction and rhetorical hostility that have characterized the base with an exploration of how ‘home’ can take shape.

Russian foreign policy demonstrates continuity and change. The Russian Federation has acted in several scenarios and, since 2000, with Vladimir Putin, its main objective has been to consolidate the status of the Russian Federation as a great power, in order to return to the glorious Soviet era. Maximising power and the pursuit of internal security are essential, because there is an international system in permanent anarchy. Putin’s third term was marked by the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of the Crimea, which contributed to a historical turning point in Russian foreign policy. Western sanctions due to the occupation of Crimea and military interference in eastern Ukraine have opened up a period of greater rivalry between Moscow and Washington, as well as the need for Russia to diversify its relations with emerging economies such as Iran and Turkey. This study finds out that Ankara and Tehran have a historical relationship with Moscow, despite some episodes and divergent positions that at certain moments have harmed relations. The issue of Syria, the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, agreements on oil and natural gas and relations with the Kurdish people are some of the key issues in the more or less friendly relations of the Kremlin with Ankara and Tehran. The state of Russian foreign policy and Russia’s relations with regional actors in the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Kurds) as well as the challenges Vladimir Putin’s Russia has to face in the region are addressed.

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Abstract: This article examines how Russians and the Russian government have conceptualized their compatriots living in Central Asia, examines the circumstances surrounding Russian immigration to and emigration from the region, discusses the role played by the Russian diaspora in Russian foreign policy and Central Asian politics, and outlines the Putin administration's approach to Russian compatriots abroad. President Putin has devoted considerable attention to promoting and defending the interests of Russian compatriots in Central Asia, and Russian foreign policy is slowly changing to utilize soft power more effectively in achieving Russia's goals in the near abroad. Russia's nationalist movement actively lobbies for greater attention to the diaspora in Russian foreign policy. A surge of patriotism resulting from terrorist attacks and the Chechnya conflict heightens Russians' sense of identity and could lead to greater pressures to defend Russians abroad. The Russian diaspora is now more important symbolically than it was under Yeltsin, yet traditional political and security considerations, a vigorous energy diplomacy, and participation in emerging regional organizations overshadow Russia's compatriots abroad as factors in Moscow's Central Asia policy. Key words: Central Asia, compatriots, diaspora, foreign policy, Russians ********** Diasporas can have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policies of states. The American Jewish community, for example, constitutes a powerful voice within the United States in support of Israel, and shapes American policy toward the Middle East. For years, the Armenian community has influenced U.S. policy toward Turkey and the Caucasus, whereas Florida's Cubans have pressured Washington to maintain a hard line against Castro's regime. Ethnic Chinese living in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Taiwan have invested heavily in the PRC, contributing substantially to the mainland's phenomenal economic growth. When the Soviet Union collapsed, some twenty-five million ethnic Russians were living in the fourteen non-Russian republics, with several million more scattered around the globe. This article assesses the importance of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Central Asia (collectively termed compatriots) for Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. The Russian diaspora issue was on Moscow's agenda only intermittently when Boris Yeltsin was in office. President Putin has emphasized restoring Russian power and influence in the world, particularly along the unstable southern border where ethnic Russians mix with peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Under Putin, Russian nationalism is becoming a stronger force in domestic politics and foreign policy. Given these developments, Russian foreign policy could become more assertive in defending the interests of Russians abroad, or at least in playing the diaspora card in international relations. Moscow's efforts to exert greater influence in the southern border regions, which pose the greatest security challenge to Russia, elevate the potential importance of the Russian diaspora as an instrument of statecraft. This article addresses the following questions. First, how have Russians and the Russian government conceptualized their compatriots living in Central Asia? What are the circumstances surrounding Russian immigration to and emigration from the region? What role has the Russian diaspora played in Russian foreign policy and Central Asian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union? Has Vladimir Putin's administration adopted a substantially different approach to Russian compatriots abroad than that of Boris Yeltsin? What has been Russia's ethnic strategy in the critical security region of Central Asia, and how does the ethnic factor fit into Russia's overall strategy toward the region? My first task is to present some theoretical issues relevant to diaspora politics and foreign policy, outline the pattern of ethnic Russian settlement in Central Asia, and discuss the elusive concept of Russian identity outside the Russian Federation. …

Significance The previous day, the Pentagon said that Moscow was trying to influence events in Libya. Since intervening in Syria in September 2015, President Vladimir Putin has established Russia as one of the dominant external powers in the Middle East. Impacts The new US administration is likely to seek ways of working with Russia in the Middle East, rather than challenging it. Russia’s influence will be constrained by a lack of financial muscle, and by the limited slate of products and services that it can sell. Moscow will face problems with regional allies or clients that refuse to bend to its will, become a financial drain or try to manipulate it.

Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and The War in Iraq

Despite the increase in Russian activity in the Middle East over the past decade, it remains a second-order priority for Moscow: the US, the West broadly, and China form Russia’s main geostrategic focus. Under President Putin, Russia’s involvement in the Middle East has three primary aims. Firstly, as part of Putin’s opposition to US global strategy, he wants to counter US objectives there when he disagrees with them. Secondly, he seeks to benefit Russia economically through coordination with Middle East energy producers on oil and gas prices, encouraging Gulf sovereign wealth funds to invest in Russia, and selling arms to this conflict prone area. Thirdly, for domestic security reasons, he needs to prevent the region’s turmoil infecting Russia’s Muslim-majority regions. His approach to the region is tactical, rather than strategic.

There has been much speculation about Russia’s motives for intervening in Syria in September 2015. Certainly, Russia’s direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war was a foreign policy objective in order to shore up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian regime, Moscow’s ally since the Cold War period, and keep Syria together as a unified state and maintain the Russian foothold in the Middle East. We argue that Russia projected force beyond its periphery to confirm Russia’s status as a great power and return it to its rightful place among the world powers. Russia’s status aspirations led the Kremlin to undertake risky policy manoeuvring, like the annexation of the Crimea and the military campaign in Syria. President Vladimir Putin wanted to pursue multipolarity; that is, a long-term strategy in which interstate relations should be based upon international law, mutual respect and equal partnership, with a proper role for Russia in global politics. The Kremlin still considers that fighting international terrorism, religious fanaticism and separatism are internal and external threats that undermine Russia’s national security and global security.