Abstract

ABSTRACTBy 1970, the United States had undergone a remarkable volte-face on dealing with People's Republic of China as a nuclear weapon state, from outspoken opposition to political recognition. Aware of the importance of co-opting Beijing in the emerging multipolar order, President Richard Nixon sought any possible opening to the Chinese leadership. One secret backchannel passed through Bucharest, whom Washington rewarded with sensitive atomic assistance for its good offices. If in the mid-1960s dealing with China was regarded as detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation, by the early 1970s, the United States relaxed its nuclear exports policy towards useful adversaries, such as Romania, all in pursuit of geopolitical interests.

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