PAYOFF-BASED PROBABILISTIC INTERACTION MODEL ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME

Abstract

In the spatial public goods game (SPGG), punishment effectively promotes cooperation but often reduces the collective benefits of cooperators and punishers. In order to increase revenue, we propose a probabilistic interaction domain model considering both strategy type and payoff level. In this model, players are divided into two types, successful players with payoffs higher than the payoff threshold and failed players with payoffs lower than the payoff threshold. A successful player is less likely to change the interaction range than a failed player. Through extensive simulations, it is shown to verify that a higher payoff threshold leads to a more pronounced promotion effect on cooperation and corresponds to a higher cooperation return. Moreover, introducing dynamic interaction domain can rapidly remove defectors from the vicinity of cooperative players on regular lattices. Reducing the payoff gap between punishers and cooperators helps mitigate the system’s second-order free-riding problem. Additionally, through analysis of the critical parameters, it is revised that incorporating diversity in interaction structures substantively enhances cooperation level.