The impact of dynamic reward on cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Abstract

Debates persist regarding how different forms of rewards influence public cooperation. In many real-world scenarios, individuals who consistently honor multiple commitments receive higher credit scores than those who fulfill only one commitment. Inspired by this, herein dynamic reward is introduced into the spatial public goods game, wherein the probability of receiving a reward increases with the number of consecutive cooperations by individuals. To illustrate the role of the dynamic reward mechanism, fixed reward is used as a comparison to investigate the impact of dynamic reward on the evolution of cooperation. Through extensive simulations, we find that the phases presented by dynamic reward are more than those by fixed reward. Moreover, it is more conducive to cooperation than fixed reward, indicating that dynamic reward can more effectively resolve social dilemmas. Additionally, the higher initial probability of reward promotes the earlier emergence of cooperation. This research broadens the form of reward, enhancing our understanding of dynamic reward in promoting prosocial behaviors in the spatial public goods game.