Abstract

Ironically, saving Cyprus' cultural heritage was never a main objective of the United States' (US) foreign assistance program. Yet, some of the most tangible and recognizable examples of the US' commitment to peace on the long-divided island are the monuments and sites where Cypriots from across the island and its political and ethnic divides toiled together for the sake of preserving a shared past and shaping a common future. Indeed, some of the program's most compelling results are borne out of collaboration in the politically charged and often controversial field of cultural heritage.Since 1975, the US has provided well over $500 million in foreign assistance to Cyprus through a succession of congressional earmarks. Grant assistance, mainly through the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, kept Cypriots alive in the months that followed the violence of 1974. Reflecting the changing circumstances on the island over the years, the emphasis of the program shifted from emergency relief to recovery to longer-term development. In the late 1990s, the US assistance program began to actively promote bi-communal cooperation between Cypriots on initiatives that would benefit the island as a whole and support a broad political settlement. It invited proposals from both sides and became the first donor to directly fund the activities of Cypriot non-governmental organizations.Early on, the appeal of joint cultural heritage activities became evident and their potential to contribute to mutual understanding obvious. Physically separated and increasingly estranged, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots welcomed opportunities to improve both the quality of life and the possibility of dialogue in the divided capital of Nicosia, for example. Under the Nicosia Master Plan,1 the US assistance program—through its partnership with the UN Development Programme2—supported brick-and-mortar work on the Venetian walls that surround the city as well as on dozens of historic properties within it. These are early examples of the power of cultural heritage to inspire cross-cultural collaboration even in the absence of progress on the political front—indeed, even in the face of impossible circumstances. Until 2003, Cypriots were not able to cross from one community to the other, making bi-communal contact nearly impossible. Yet, international facilitation (and funding), inspired local leadership, and sustained commitment made it possible for the two sides to cooperate in conceiving, planning, and implementing projects that restored individual buildings (including, e.g., Tahtakale Mosque, the Shadow Theatre Museum, and the Büyük Hamam), documented and stabilized sections of the UN-patrolled Buffer Zone,3 and revitalized entire neighborhoods (Chrysaliniotissa and Arab Ahmet).4Beyond improving some of the physical elements of the island's shared cultural heritage, these activities confirmed what polls would later quantify—namely that an overwhelming majority of Cypriots see the protection of cultural heritage as an effective way to build the confidence of one community in the other. In fact, a 2008 public opinion survey noted that a staggering 92 percent of Greek Cypriots and 72 percent of Turkish Cypriots believe that protecting the cultural heritage of one community that is located within the territory of the other is an important way to improve understanding over the dividing line (Kaymak, Lordos, and Tocci 2008).While any settlement would ultimately be reached at the political level, the US assistance program recognized that it would be up to Cypriots from both communities to implement any agreement and to ensure that what results is an enduring peace for the island. In the meantime, however, ways were needed for the two sides to work cooperatively in order to begin solving shared day-to-day problems regardless of, though not at odds with, the political process. Forging channels of communication and habits of cooperation could in fact pave the way for common action in any post-settlement arrangement while reinforcing the ongoing political processes by demonstrating the benefits of working together in the immediate term. Both sides could point to the results of bi-communal cultural heritage activities as proof that understanding exists and progress is possible. The inverse was also true in that Cypriots visiting orphaned sites on the other side of the dividing Green Line after 2003 were profoundly affected by the state of monuments, places of worship, and cemeteries. Addressing neglected and decaying sites of cultural importance would serve to remove an irritant in fledgling contact between the two communities.While there were lots of good reasons to support cultural heritage initiatives, including public support, forging the consensus necessary to implement preservation and restoration projects north of the Green Line proved to be a Herculean task. The Greek Cypriots were reluctant to endorse Turkish-Cypriot work on cultural patrimony while the Turkish Cypriots were reticent to embrace international assistance in this area. Many of the activities funded by USAID's Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth (CyPEG)4 were designed to assist the Turkish Cypriots in preserving and managing the plethora of cultural heritage sites under their caretakership for two reasons: first, because they are economic assets that can contribute to balanced and sustained growth; and second, because responsible management of these sites will improve the political climate on the island. Any work in the area of cultural heritage in the Turkish-Cypriot community—no matter how intellectually desirable, developmentally sensible, or economically wise—was (and remains) highly controversial internationally and in the Greek-Cypriot community. Most of the sites are of cultural, religious, and sentimental significance to Orthodox Greek Cypriots, and all are considered to fall one way or another under the authority of the Department of Antiquities of the Republic of Cyprus. Any intervention without the department's explicit consent and involvement (which is withheld due to the non-recognition of any legitimate political authority in the Turkish-Cypriot community) is, at best, suspect but usually simply dismissed as illegitimate.In order to be able to work in this high-risk, but high-payoff, field of cultural heritage in support of a settlement, it was necessary to calibrate every action carefully and to consider and avoid a long list of not-always obvious sensitivities on both sides of the Green Line. A prudent respect for each side's “red lines” made it possible to take on increasingly complicated projects that sought to intensify the level of engagement by and between the two sides at each step. The US assistance program can boast a long list of cultural heritage accomplishments from supporting the (relatively simple) restoration of a Turkish-Cypriot traditional mud-brick building in a rural village to the (more complex) stabilization of the fourteenth-century Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Famagusta with on-site participation of experts from the Department of Antiquities.Progress on cultural heritage activities in the Turkish-Cypriot community was possible for many of the same reasons that contributed to the success of the early Nicosia Master Plan projects. US funding and international expertise provided resources and recognized proficiency. Italian conservators, American archaeologists, and British archivists worked alongside Cypriot experts on actual sites, sharing their skills while providing a space in which Cypriots could learn from and interact with each other comfortably. Additionally, the guidance provided by the US Embassy and USAID in implementing all CyPEG activities ensured that projects were designed and implemented with a keen appreciation for local sensitivities and the realities of working on a divided island. The program was flexible enough to choose wisely and adjust its approach when and if necessary. While imperfect, the criteria used to identify projects had to include some assessment of feasibility, based on the political situation and the myriad of stakeholders involved and had the consistency of US policy to guide it.Local leadership was critical to success. The US' cultural heritage work in the northern part of Cyprus far exceeded expectations for what could be accomplished in this sensitive space in large part because of the capable local managers employed by USAID's implementing partners and because of the support of local champions. For example, the Bishopric of Morphou, the past and current residents of Kontea village, and the Cyprus Foundations Administration (EVKAF) were committed to the shared objective of protecting and preserving threatened cultural heritage such that they were willing to overcome the serious political difficulties in undertaking this work and then seeing it through. Without the engagement and commitment of the Bishopric of Morphou and reciprocal support from the Turkish-Cypriot antiquities authorities, the mosaics at Soli would still be disappearing tessera by tessera and the Cathedral of Saint Mamas along with its unique ciborium would continue to suffer from irreparable damage caused by water and insects. Thanks to a shared commitment to cultural heritage and a willingness to find ways to work together despite the division, these and other parts of Cyprus' shared cultural heritage have been documented, stabilized, repaired, conserved, or restored.The US assistance program helped Cypriots protect, enhance, and enjoy the places that matter to them in order to facilitate cooperation, remove a thorn in the sides of relations between the two, and develop local capacity. Better managed cultural heritage sites can generate not only increased interest, but also resources for additional work in this area as well as for economic development more generally.The program leaves behind dozens of sites across the island that stand as shining examples of cooperation. They testify to what is possible despite the conflict, division, mistrust, and all the associated complications. The models employed to build consensus in places like Kontea were successful and are being replicated now by groups of Cypriots committed to their shared cultural heritage. Furthermore, the nature of heritage projects is such that the tangible accomplishments left behind ensure that the next activity at that site will start at a better place, and the list of successes to which one can refer when undertaking a similar project is longer and more convincing. Ebbs on the political front cannot dismantle or otherwise undo the repair or restoration of a site. Perhaps even more importantly, the results of the US' investments in Cyprus' cultural heritage include the networks of people who have the experience of working together. Beyond promoting mutual understanding, these projects have formed habits of cooperation—something that is essential to future coexistence. A testament to the importance of this work and the significance of its results is the establishment (and success) of the bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus. With funding from the European Union, through the UN Development Programme—Partnership for the Future, the committee is working to implement a series of practical measures for the proper maintenance, preservation, physical protection, and restoration of the immovable cultural heritage of Cyprus (UN 2012). Even while formal talks are on hold, the committee's work continues improving conditions site by site.Appreciating Cyprus' multicultural past is one way of ensuring a more peaceful future. Indeed, preserving Cyprus' cultural heritage has proven to be an effective unifying force that merits international support. It continues to be a unique way through which the two sides demonstrate respect for the “other,” build the goodwill essential to any future settlement, and save elements of the island's past that are in danger of being lost forever. Part of the US foreign assistance program's legacy is the sites—mud-brick vernacular buildings, medieval chapels and cathedrals, and Ottoman fountains alike—that it has helped preserve for future generations.

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