Abstract
Existing research has extensively explored various approaches to enhancing the governance of community-managed commons; however, limited studies have discussed whether it is effective to partition commons and devolve them from communal to smaller, sub-communal groups. We examine this question based on the evidence from two common-property timber production communities that devolved their forests from the administrative village to villagers’ groups in Fujian, China. Using the comparative case study method, we explore the mechanisms by which this organizational restructuring affected democratic governance, revenue allocation and economic efficiency of timber production. We find that by decreasing the size of forest management units, the restructuring increases the participation of ordinary villagers in community forestry and enhances the equity of revenue allocation. However, physically partitioning forests may undermine scale economies, and the small, sub-communal forest management groups tend to have weak financial and managerial capacities. Thus, partitioning forests into villagers’ groups threatens the long-run efficiency of commercial timber production. This research not only presents an innovative toolkit of enhancing community forest management but also sheds light on the optimal organizational structure of community forest management under different organizational goals and contexts.
Highlights
Small groups are often argued to better organize the collective actions of managing the commons than large groups (Olson, 1965; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004)
We find that the restructuring enhanced democratic governance and improved the distribution of timber revenues within the community but had mixed effects on the economic efficiency of timber production
This study focuses on an innovative approach to restructuring community forest management: partitioning forest commons and devolving them to smaller subgroups
Summary
Small groups are often argued to better organize the collective actions of managing the commons than large groups (Olson, 1965; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004) This argument has a clear policy implication: it may be worth partitioning the commons and assigning the divided commons to smaller subgroups. Some studies have shown that small groups may lack the capacity for mobilizing resources required for collective actions (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001; Agrawal & M.Haas, 2000), which indicates that partitioning the commons to subgroups may have downsides. A large number of studies have investigated the role of group size in governing the commons, they generally use cross-sectional data and examine how communities of different sizes perform differently in governing the commons
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