Abstract
We investigate the problem of constructing a Pareto-efficient social welfare function that respects individual rights when preferences are defined over the location of a public facility. Restricting individual preferences to be either single-peaked or single-dipped, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Pareto-efficient social welfare function that respects individual rights.
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