Abstract
The very first paper published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic form games by taking account of an extraneous space of states of the world, on which every player has a subjective probability distribution and private information. We review some of Aumann’s results as well as some properties and extensions of the best known by-product of his seminal paper, the “correlated equilibrium”.
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