Para-constitutional engineering and federalism: Informal constitutional change through intergovernmental agreements

Abstract

Abstract This article explores the phenomenon of informal constitutional change with a particular focus on the role played by intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) concluded between members of a federation. It has two objectives. The first is to add IGAs to the catalogue of methods through which constitutions are altered without recourse to formal amendment procedures. Using Canada as a case study, we highlight a paradox: by rendering unconstitutional certain legislative initiatives meant to circumvent formal rules of constitutional amendment, courts are actually inviting political actors, notably the executive branches, to resort to even more fluid and informal methods of altering the Constitution. Second, we bring the concept of “para-constitutionality” into the broader literature on informal constitutional change. Para-constitutionality captures two distinct dimensions of informal constitutional change which are often conflated. “Para” in the Greek sense signifies “circumvention.” The focus here is on effectivity, on the impact of mechanisms (such as IGAs) on the overall constitutional order. By contrast, “para” in the Latin sense means “against.” It is concerned with constitutional (in)validity. We seek to underscore that even when strategies are not found to be unconstitutional, they may nevertheless have a transformative impact on the overall federal architecture. In conclusion, we suggest that an implicit commitment to intergovernmental transactions and compromise, both inherent to federalism, may explain judicial benevolence in the face of negotiated para-constitutional engineering mechanisms, in contrast to unilateral legislative attempts at informal constitutional change.