OUT-OF-MARKET EFFICIENCIES, TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS, AND CONSUMER WELFARE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Abstract

This article analyzes the scope of out-of-market efficiencies in competition policy from a legal and economic perspective. It identifies potential shortcomings in neglecting their relevance, both in relation to the economic principles of two-sided platforms and, more generally, in the fulfillment of the consumer welfare standard. This article tackles this issue by looking at the specific condition laid out in Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requiring that a fair share of efficiency benefits must be passed on to consumers in order to justify an otherwise anticompetitive agreement. The implications of forbidding or allowing aggregation of efficiencies across markets are examined with reference to the two-sided market of payment card systems and the anticompetitive concerns regarding Multilateral Interchange Fees.