OPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, AND STABLE PEACE IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

Abstract

Over four years ago, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with the mediation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), signed what was billed as “the final peace agreement,” a compact ending nearly three decades of armed conflict between the two sides. The agreement provided for the establishment, after a transitional period, of a regional autonomous government in Muslim and mixed Christian-Muslim areas of Mindanao. The government and the MNLF hoped that in the course of the implementation of this peace accord, they would be able to attract and win over the great majority of the Muslims in the Southern Philippines—or the Moro people—including the leaders, members, and supporters of Moro rebel groups still fighting for secession, and that the accord would eventually pave the way for the attainment of a just and enduring peace in the Southern Philippines. Under the administration of now unseated President Joseph E. Estrada, the prospects for achieving such a peace somewhat dimmed. After countless violations by both government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) forces of a July 1997 cease-fire agreement, Estrada declared an all-out war against the MILF in March 2000. A few months later, in the wake of the capture by