Abstract
The voucher portfolio problem (VPP) is distinctive because the proportion of ownership resulting from a voucher bid is unknown, and the performance of a privatized firm depends on its ownership composition. We investigate the VPP when bidders have various skills in restructuring the firms in which they acquire ownership. We explore the impact of bidding on performance and derive the optimal ownership pattern. We show how ownership by voucher funds depends on their skills and voucher endowments and study conditions under which the most skilled acquire the most ownership. Finally, we assess the mass privatization plans of the Czech Republic, Russia, and Poland.J. Comp. Econom.,February 1997,24(1), pp. 25–43. Stern School of Business, New York University; and ESSEC, France.
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