Abstract
<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the effect of information suppression on Naor's model as well as on Edelson and Hildebrand's model under geometric distribution. We set the suitable non-cooperative games and search for their Nash equilibria under the observable and unobservable system. In each case, we analyze the effects of information level on the customers' equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies as well as on the profit maximization of the system manager. The socially optimal behavior and the inefficiency of the equilibrium strategies are quantified via the price of anarchy measure. We discuss a comparison study of the profit maximization and social welfare under an imposed admission fee. Also, the impact of information on the selfish and social optimal joining rates is examined. Numerical results are presented to exemplify the impact of system parameters on the optimal behavior of customers under different information levels.
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