On the Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights

Abstract

This article presents the basic problems surrounding the question of philosophical justification of human rights. In the first part of this paper, the Author points out the deficit of philosophical reflection both in modern discourse on human rights, and within the legal sphere. This deficit leads to a series of negative consequences, such as 1) an excessive number of rights considered to be inalienable and inherent, which results in a depreciation of their importance (the problem of the „inflation” of rights); 2) the ideological entanglement of human rights; and 3) aseverance of the relationship between rights and duties. At the same time, there is much controversy currently surrounding the cathegory of human person and his/her dignity. This issue – which carries with it serious practical implications – demonstrates the necessity of in-depth philosophical reflection on the ontological and antrophological foundations of human rights, understood as an ethical minimum that can be accepted by people of different cultures and worldviews.