On the Analysis of "Protagoras" 351B-360E

Abstract

HAVING SECURED PROTAGORAS' ASSENT to the identity of piety, justice, wisdom, and temperance, Socrates attempts to complete his proof of the unity of the virtues by demonstrating the identity of courage and wisdom. After an initial foray in this direction (the fourth argument) is countered by Protagoras, who accuses him of committing a simple fallacy (349el-351b2),1 Socrates launches into the lengthy and complex final argument of the Protagoras (the fifth argument). This argument, which contains Plato's fullest single statement of the Socratic paradoxes, has received a good deal of attention in recent years, but its most important segment, Socrates' attempt to prove the non-existence of moral weakness, or akrasia (a word not used in the Protagoras), is still the subject of much controversy. In particular, there is widespread disagreement about his proofs (a) that the belief of the many-that people perform certain actions, while knowing them to be wrong, though they don't have to do them, because they are overcome by pleasureis absurd; and (b) that the actions are really due to ignorance. In light of this widespread disagreement, these points, which are central not only to the interpretation of the Protagoras but to Plato's early dialogues as a whole, deserve to be examined anew. The position taken in this paper is that Socrates' interpretation of akrasia in the Protagoras is dependent on a certain view of human motivation, which we may call Egoism-its precise nature is discussed below. In particular, I will argue that Socrates is able to reduce the many's account of akrasia to absurdity by showing that it conflicts with the obvious truth of Egoism. While some semblance of this view has been argued before, most notably by Santas,2 it has recently come under attack by C. C. W. Taylor, in his extremely helpful commentary on the Protagoras.3 The purpose of this paper is to defend the Egoism-view. I will attempt to show not only that Socrates' argument depends upon