Abstract
PLATO'S ethics in the earlier dialogues (at least up to the Republic) is characterized by two doctrines commonly known as the Socratic paradoxes. The first of these is that no one desires evil things and that all who pursue evil things do so involuntarily ;1 the second doctrine is that virtue is knowledge and that all who do injustice or wrong do so involuntarily.2 Students of Plato have found these doctrines puzzling and paradoxical. It is not difficult to see why. We commonly think that men sometimes harm themselves knowing that they are doing so, and that often they do what is morally wrong knowing that it is morally wrong when it is in their power to do otherwise. Incontinence and moral weakness are supposed to be familiar facts of experience; yet the doctrines just mentioned seem to contradict these facts. How are we to account for this? Are we to suppose that Plato held, and held most persistently through several dialogues, views that contradict facts with which presumably everyone is acquainted? Most students of Plato have supposed just this. T. Gomperz, for example, writes:
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