On Sexual Consent in Canada

Abstract

Consent is an extremely important principle within the law—so important it is defined twice within the Criminal Code: first in s. 265, the assault provision which also governs the law of sexual assault, and again in s. 273.1, where the Code provides additional definition specifically within the context of sexual assault. The limits of consent have been further defined through case law, especially in R v Ewanchuk.
 Canadians would be surprised to discover that Ewanchuk determined it is illegal to initiate sexual activity via sexual touching, or to kiss a sleeping spouse. To keep people safe from inappropriate sexual touching, we have outlawed activities most intimate partners would not object to: this creates a dilemma about when protection exceeds its necessity and becomes inappropriate control of sexual autonomy. It is this dilemma this article addresses.
 Ultimately, this article argues that Canada’s sexual assault laws must change for two reasons: first, by criminalizing behaviour that is not morally wrong, the criminal law is overbroad and doesn’t fulfil its expressive function, and; while enacted with the noble goal of protecting the sexual autonomy of women, our consent laws serve to restrict the sexual autonomy of women in ways that are objectionable.