Abstract

Abstract This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in occupational distribution. Workers’ utility depends on salary and working hours, and women have a greater aversion to longer working hours than men. Simulations indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward the working-hour preferences of men by requiring longer working hours. Similarly, if women have a disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men, fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced. JEL classification: E24, J16, J64, J71

Highlights

  • Earnings and the number of hours worked are considerably different for men and women in the labor market

  • Empirical studies find that many workers are not perfectly matched to jobs that have their desired working hours and that those who report dissatisfaction with their hours tend to change employers to work in positions that are more in line with their preferred hours (Altonji and Paxson 1988; Kahn and Lang 1991; 1995; 2001)

  • 4 Conclusion In this paper, I analyze an equilibrium search model in which salary and working hours are job attributes, and men and women differ in their working-hour preferences

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Summary

Introduction

Earnings and the number of hours worked are considerably different for men and women in the labor market. Women tend to work in occupations that require shorter hours and pay lower wages, whereas men tend to work in longer-hour, higher-paying jobs. Their analysis shows that women overcrowd into occupations in which they can find (i) a smaller degree of employer discrimination, (ii) job characteristics preferred by women, (iii) a comparative advantage for their gender, and/or (iv) less social pressure All these models are based on a perfectly competitive labor market, in which the labor supply curve facing an individual firm is perfectly elastic. Employers endogenously choose to post job offers with longer working hours to dissuade women (who are averse to long hours of work) from accepting these jobs This strategy compensates employers for the utility loss from hiring women..

Discrimination
Equilibrium distribution of job offers
Simulation
Baseline case without discrimination
Conclusion

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