Abstract

This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in occupational distribution. Workers' utility depends on salary and working hours, and women have a greater aversion to market hours than men. Simulations indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward men's preferences; employers require longer working hours, and fewer women work at these jobs. Similarly, if women have a disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men, fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced.

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