Obscenity as an Esthetic Category

Abstract

My problem is not what to do about obscenity, but what to make of it. Control over the arts in this country-whether by official power or by unofficial influencerests largely on allegations of obscenity. But patterns of social control cannot reasonably be appraised without some conception of what it is that is being controlled. Accordingly, I ask what constitutes obscenity in relation to the arts: Can a work of art be obscene and still be esthetic in status and function? What part, if any, does the obscene play in the esthetic experience? What characteristics of the art object mark its occurrence? These questions are meant as belonging to the philosophy of art, not to its psychology or sociology. To answer them is not to assert matters of fact, but to clarify relations of ideas. Such a clarification must take facts into account, of course-but its outcome, if successful, is a clear conception rather than a true proposition. Still less does an answer to these questions entail a social policy or a procedure for implementing policy. I do not pretend that the distinctions to be drawn in this essay can be directly applied in a court of law. I shall be content if they throw light on the problem of obscenity for the artist, his audience, and the critic who interprets each to the other.