Object-dependent and Property dependent Contents

Abstract

summary In a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth-value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something (its mode of presentation), and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra- and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We suggest that the divide be based on ontological considerations related to the way content depends on external factors. There is a fundamental difference, we submit, between objectdependent and propertydependent contents. The requirements concerning modes of presentation as well as cognitive significance can be met by one kind of content. This content, it will appear, is propertydependent, but never object-dependent. 1. Intioduction In its most general formulation, externalism maintains the dependence of content on external factors. We shall classify externalisms according to two main criteria. We shall consider first the kind of dependence and the kind of item on which the dependence is supposed to be grounded. In particular, we shall distinguish object-dependence from property dependence. Secondly, we shall classify externalisms according to the demands placed on the role content has to play in a theory of representation. We shall distinguish four kinds of content according to these demands and several forms of externalism about those kinds of content. Finally, we shall consider an internalist argument based on the notion of first-person authority. We shall argue that an externalist position based on Philosophisches Seminar, Universitit Tiibingen, Bursagasse 1, D-72070 Tiibmgen, -y. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences in Karlovy Vary (Czeck 9ublc) in Sepgmber 1993 and in Neuchitel (Switzerland) in November 1993. We would hke to thank the participants for helpful comments. We would also lie to thank Peter Simons and Michael McGettigan for their assistance in checking the English of this article.