Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality

Abstract

I will focus here on the following questions. (1) What constitutes the most fundamental kind of semantic content in thought and language, the kind of content sometimes called Original intentionality'? (2) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality, solely by virtue of the functional roles played by their internal states vis-a-vis (i) other internal states, (ii) input and output states, and (iii) causal/historical connections linking such internal and bodily states to states of the external environment?1 (3) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality in some other way? (4) How does Searle 's famous thought experiment bear upon questions (l)-(3)?In section 1, 1 will summarize recent work of mine in philosophy of mind - often collaborative with George Graham and/or John Tienson - that bears on question (l).2 The answer to this question that my collaborators and I favor and have elsewhere defended is this: original intentionality is what we call phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic feature of mentality, is itself inherently intentional. Phenomenal intentionality, in turn, grounds other kinds of intentionality that are metaphysically less fundamental - specifically, (a) certain kinds of mental reference (e.g., to concrete individuals and to natural kinds), and (b) the intentionality of public language.In section 2, 1 will address questions (2)-(4), on the basis of my favored answer to question (1). Given the contention that original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, the answer to question (2) is no: original intentionality requires phenomenal consciousness with suitably rich intentional content; so, since phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mentality whereas functional role is entirely relational and nonintrinsic, original intentionality cannot be constituted solely by the possession of internal states with some specific functional role. The answer to question (3) is maybe: it depends upon whether or not certain internal physical states instantiated by the robot would not only play suitable functional roles within the robot, but in addition would be states upon which the pertinent states of phenomenal consciousness - phenomenally intentional states - are supervenient. And the answer to question (4) is this: the real moral of Searle 's Chinese room thought experiment is that genuine original intentionality requires the presence of internal states with intrinsic phenomenal character that is inherently intentional - a feature that cannot be possessed by any entity (either robotic or flesh-and-blood) solely by virtue of the functional roles played by its internal states.In section 3, 1 will set forth a new argument in support of the contention that original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. The argument will proceed via a series of thought-experimental scenarios that collectively constitute a sequence, similar in structure to a series of visual images that gradually change (say) from a good depiction of Elvis into a good depiction of Bill Clinton. Searle's original Chinese room thought experiment will be the initial stage in the morph sequence, occupying the Elvis slot.1. Phenomenal Intentionality, Externalistic Intentionality, and Linguistic MeaningMuch of the literature in recent philosophy of mind has embraced some version or other of functionalism concerning intentional mental states - and, moreover, strong externalism about mental intentionality. Roughly and generically, strong externalism is the view that all mental intentionality depends constitutively on certain external connections (e.g., causal, and/or covariational, and/or historical, and/or evolutionary) between a creature with mentality and that creature's wider environment.Lately Graham and Tienson and I have been articulating a general approach to mental intentionality that is very much at odds with the various versions of strong externalism that have recently been fashionable in philosophy of mind. …