Aims and Claims of Externalist Arguments

Abstract

away from certain aspects of a creature's environmental embedding. We can be explanatory pluralists here, and allow that these different notions of content are fitted for different explanatory tasks. The 'narrower' notions fit into broader generalisations, but cannot provide explanations of happenings under more specific descriptions. Now, it is far from obvious that there can be a genuine notion of content that simultaneously abstracts away from all environmental features. But, if there is such a notion of 'narrow' content, it need not be in explanatory competition with externalist perceptual content. As Burge says (1986, p. 38): [This kind of content] will not serve the needs of psychological explanation as actually practiced. For the descriptions of information are too inspecific to account for specific successes in solving problems in retrieving information about the actual, objective world. In Section 1, I set out the minimal requirements upon an example that would establish modal externalism about perceptual content. Now, I have done something to make clear what perceptual content is: it is a kind of non-conceptual content that is not object involving. The next step is to consider, in a summary way, the possible options for a fundamental philosophical account of perceptual. 3 Theories of Content and the Prospects for Externalism I am going to use a very crude tripartite classification of theories of content. In one category there are pure input-side theories. In a second category there are teleological theories. And in a third category there are other theories that have output-side components. Pure input-side theories of content -such as causal covariance theoriescertainly support modal externalism. In order to produce 239 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.224 on Sat, 27 Aug 2016 06:22:00 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms