Abstract
The first part of this paper highlights the debate between nuclear proliferation optimists and pessimists. It then takes some general theoretical assumptions of deterrence and examines them in the South Asian context. The second part analyses the “second-strike” capability as a strong requirement for stable deterrence in South Asia, while pointing out the risks of uncontrolled escalation and accidental nuclearisation of a conflict between India and Pakistan, due to the uncertainties and deliberate ambiguities in the strategic contingency planning of both countries.
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