The Changing Contours of Minimum Deterrence in South Asia

Abstract

Minimum deterrence is one of the important ingredients of the deterrent concept associated with nuclear weapons. Although neither the Soviet Union nor the US opted for minimum deterrence during the Cold War era since they were extremely involved in strategic overkill force competition, the concept originated when few critiqued the mad race between the two Cold War rivals and proposed an alternative that could serve the purpose of deterrence without risking nuclear war. This alternative conceptual policy posture paved the way as part of nuclear learning in South Asia where both India and Pakistan opted for minimum deterrence. The conceptualized policy option of minimum deterrence embedded well with the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia played an essential role in sustaining deterrence stability between the two countries. However, there is a fear that due to various factors, the contours of minimum deterrence in South Asia might change and minimum may no longer stay the minimum, which in turn could undermine the promising strategic stability passed by the Waltzian teaching of nuclear peace. This article conceptually discusses the changing contours of minimum deterrence in South Asia, its strategic treatment and the factors that could eventually undermine the dynamics of policy option conceptualized earlier. This article concludes that the unjust attitudes of international community favoring one side against the other, the absence of criteria based approach, and the strategic pressure on Pakistan pulling it into arms competition undermine the dynamics of minimum deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia.