Novel synergy mechanism for carbon emissions abatement in shipping decarbonization

Abstract

Greenhouse gas emissions lead to climate change, subjecting the maritime environment to severe threats. In response, globally, states and organizations are taking actions to decarbonize. In this context, this paper builds an evolutionary game analysis involving the government and shipping company under a governance framework with IMO, from a perspective of economic regulations, and explores how to establish a proper shipping decarbonization mechanism and implementation plans in the process of dynamic evolution. Based on a system dynamics simulation model, we analyzed how the cap-and-trade policy system, tax-and-subsidy policy system, and cooperative policy system perform in terms of shipping decarbonization and the role of IMO in shipping decarbonization. Our research proves that the cooperative system is more efficient and stable in decarbonization than singular economic regulations; static and dynamic implementation plans should be coordinated in different stages; and finally, IMO plays an active role in multi-agent coordinated controls.