Negotiating the Post-Revolution Constitution for Tunisia – Members of the National Constituent Assembly Share Their Experiences

Abrak Saati

doi:10.5539/ilr.v7n1p235

Abstract

Though the Tunisian transition to democracy faces challenges seven years following the 2011 revolution and four years following the enactment of the new constitution, the country still constitutes a ‘success story’, especially in comparison to neighbouring states that were also touched by the Arab Uprisings. This paper takes an interest in exploring the Tunisian constitution-making process, and especially the political elite negotiated compromises that took place in the National Constituent Assembly. How were Tunisian religious and secular political forces able to unite and compromise on a constitutional document; what motivated their actions during the constitutional talks? Ideologies, rational pragmatism, self-serving interests or something else? This is a pertinent question that has bearing for other states that are in transition from authoritarian rule, in which religious and secular political parties are struggling to draft the political rules of the game anew. This is a qualitative study, based on interviews with political representatives, from a broad range of Tunisian political parties, who were part of the constitutional negotiations. Their responses suggest that pragmatism and rationality took precedence over ideological positions during the negotiations, and that this was indispensable for a draft to be produced. Despite this, the study argues that ideologies were likely not irrelevant in the minds of the political elites who were negotiating the post-revolution constitution, and that previous agreements and discussions among these elites that were, in fact, based on ideological positions, facilitated the constitutional negotiations that took place in the aftermath of the ousting of Ben-Ali.

Highlights

Seven years have passed since the Tunisian revolution; four years have passed since the promulgation of the new, post-revolutionary, constitution
The logic is as simple as it is rational and pragmatic; constitutional enshrinement implies placing religion under the checks and balances of state institutions which, in turn, circumvents the possible radicalization of groups that might feel that they have been denied constitutional rights. There is another strand of scholarly thinking that does not emphasise ideologies, functional aspects, or rational self-calculating aspects as explanatory factors when it comes to increasing our understanding of why political elites behave as they do during constitutional negotiations – but that is still encountered in the literature in the field
When it comes to negotiating the Tunisian constitution, the Tunisian political elites who participated in the work of the NCA, appear to have shelved, or at least placed ideologies in the back seat, and approached the exercise of constitutional drafting in a rational and pragmatic way in order to be able to reach compromises

Summary

Introduction

Seven years have passed since the Tunisian revolution; four years have passed since the promulgation of the new, post-revolutionary, constitution. As regards Tunisia as a specific case for in-depth probing, as mentioned above, the case is an exception among its fellow Arab-Uprising counterparts; whereas unity and political compromises that profoundly altered future political processes remained (and remains) absent in the other cases, this was manifested in Tunisia, and done so by the achievement of religious and secular political actors to relate to each other under democratic conditions This makes the case pertinent to study for purposes of drawing conclusions that might be of relevance for other post-authoritarian states as well in which constitution-making includes political actors from secular and religious parties. Interviews with political elites who represented Ennahda, The Congress of the Republic, Ettakatol, The Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice and Development, Al Massar and Afek Tounes in the NCA were carried out during this field trip The responses of these individuals as regards their understanding/their experiences of working with members from other political affiliations in order to draft a constitution for post-revolutionary Tunisia, constitutes the backbone of the empirical part of this study. The final part of the study draws conclusions based on the findings of the interviews

Constitution-Making

Methodology

Negotiating the Tunisian Post-Revolutionary Constitution

Conclusions