Abstract
Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States (NNWS) must accept IAEA Safeguards to their all nuclear material in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) but Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS) do not have such obligation. From this point of view, the unbalance or discrepancy of NPT has been pointed out. Nuclear-Weapon-States conclude safeguards agreement on voluntary basis but inspections are implemented to very limited facilities. United Kingdom and France accept EURATOM safeguards to all civil nuclear material. Recently safeguards to excess nuclear material from dismantling of nuclear weapons and safeguards as verification system of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are under consideration. International system to keep nuclear material out of the use for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices is permanently necessary and it should have universality to be accepted by all states. This paper analyzes the present situation of safeguards in NWS and proposes the measures to realize universality of safeguards which dissolves unbalance and discrepancy between NNWS and NWS.
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