1124. 原子力平和利用における保障措置の観点からみた核軍縮に関連する核物質の検証措置のあり方

Abstract

Since the end of cold war, negotiations on nuclear disarmament have made progress and its verification systems are under consideration. One of them is verification system for disposition of excess nuclear materials including weapon grade plutonium between USA and Russia and another is verification system of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Such verification systems, which will be applied also to Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS), can affect IAEA safeguards applied to peaceful nuclear activities in Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States (NNWS). NNWS have much experience to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Concept of verification systems related to nuclear material for nuclear disarmament is considered and analyzed from the view point of experience of NNWS so that no additional obligation will be born by the NNWS which accept comprehensive safeguards strengthened already by additional protocol.