Pakistan's nuclear weapons program: A status report

Abstract

Now that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been concluded, the Clinton administration is likely to turn its attention toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Discussion regarding the negotiation of a FMCT occurred at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva throughout 1994-96, though no progress was made. The issue was also discussed at the April 1997 NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) Prepcom, which recommended that the issue be discussed at its next session in 1998. To engage in serious negotiations and eventually conclude a treaty, states will need to have an accurate picture of each other’s nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Without such information, developing and implementing an effective verification regime will be difficult. When looking at a country’s nuclear program, the primary concerns are how much fissile material (consisting of either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium) they possess, and where such materials are produced and/or stored. Also of concern, but not addressed by the FMCT, are steps a country took toward weaponizing its nuclear capabilities. In the case of Pakistan, there is a lack of transparency and a paucity of publicly available information about its nuclear capabilities and stockpile. This report attempts to address that shortfall by providing a comprehensive analysis of the open-source data on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES