Multi-stage incentive contract design of aviation complex product multi-task delivery strategy

Abstract

The increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict delivery efficiency. A series of delivery strategy combinations of delivery subjects will affect delivery output and delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of the subject and then investigates the effect of the incentive contract on delivery efficiency under different combinations of delivery strategies. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department to expand the benchmark incentive model, such as the degree of perceived revenue fairness, the variation of the three relationships (neutrality, competition, and cooperation), and the level of technological transformation capability. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines explicit incentives and implicit incentives is developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract exists. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Based on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.