Abstract
The moral hazard problem of agents is an important constraint in the current transformation of China's insurance industry from high expansion to quality growth. The article use a multi-task principal-agent model to study insurance agents' incentive contracts and concludes that, business quality information should be incorporated into agents' incentive and constraint mechanisms for quality growth in the insurance industry, and fixed salary contracts may be better than incentive contracts when business quality is important but difficult to monitor. It is suggested to consider agent commission-employee system reform to build trust through long-term game between insurance companies and individual agents, increase business quality assessment and achieve the same effect of explicit incentive with implicit incentive through “reputation effect”.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
