More Discretion, Less Law: Exploring the Dilemmas in the Recent Anticorruption Reform in China

Abstract

In 2018, the promulgation of the Supervision Law in China professed the central government’s determination to combat ‘corruption’ at a new level. By putting ‘all public officials exerting public powers’ under supervision, these newly-established supervisory commissions have unified the dual-track and dual-leadership supervision system that came into force since 1954. In this respect, some have argued that the supervision reform is a step forward toward promoting the Rule of Law in China. However, this paper argues that there are some key ambiguities to be clarified in this law, especially with regard to non-typical corruptions - the vaguely-defined supervised object of ‘duty-related violations’. By comparing this notion with similar concepts in other countries, particularly the ‘maladministration’ under the jurisdiction of an ombudsman, this paper suggests that the supervisory power for anticorruption needs to be checked by other state powers so as not to degenerate into a new discretionary power.