Moral requirements are still not rational requirements

P Noordhof

doi:10.1093/analys/59.3.127

Abstract

Moral requirements apply to rational agents as such. But it is a conceptual truth that if agents are morally required to act in a certain way then we expect them to act in that way. Being rational, as such, must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational agents will do what they are morally required to do. But how could this be so? It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as themselves categorical requirements of rationality or reason. For the only thing we can legitimately expect of rational agents as such is that they do what they are rationallyrequired to do (Smith 1994: 85).

Highlights

It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as themselves categorical requirements of rationality or reason
For the only thing we can legitimately expect of rational agents as such is that they do what they are rationally required to do (Smith 1994: 85)
I shall take the argument to proceed from the second sentence, as follows

Summary

Introduction

It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as themselves categorical requirements of rationality or reason. (2) We legitimately expect them to φ in C if and only if the moral requirement to Do φ in C is a requirement of reason for all agents. (2e) It is a requirement of reason that, if ‘it is right for S to φ in C’ is a moral truth, S is motivated to do φ in C (Smith 1994: 86–87).

Results

Conclusion