The normativity of rationality *

Abstract

Some requirements seem to have a sort of normative significance that others lack. The requirements of prescriptivist grammar or the local Boy Scout troop lack the normative significance that the requirements of morality and prudence enjoy. Rationality has traditionally been seen on the side of morality and prudence. Indeed, it has often been assumed that rationality is on the steadiest normative footing of them all. Despite this, it has become popular to doubt the normative significance of rationality. This chapter provides an opinionated overview of the debate about the normative significance of rationality. The chapter carries out four main tasks. First, it introduces common views about the nature of rationality. These views tether rationality to facts about coherence. Second, it introduces common views about the nature of normative force. These views tether normative force to normative reasons. Third, it shows that when you combine the views about rationality with the views about normative force, it is very plausible that rationality lacks normative force. The fourth task is to explicate two ways to respond to this skepticism about the normative force of rationality. In the end, I argue that rationality does have normative force by rejecting coherentist views about rationality. The requirements of rationality are determined by the possessed normative reasons. What you ought to do is also determined by possessed normative reasons. Thus, the requirements of rationality have normative force.