Abstract

Modern theories of moral judgment predict that both conscious reasoning and unconscious emotional influences affect the way people decide about right and wrong. In a series of experiments, we tested the effect of subliminal and conscious priming of disgust facial expressions on moral dilemmas. “Trolley-car”-type scenarios were used, with subjects rating how acceptable they found the utilitarian course of action to be. On average, subliminal priming of disgust facial expressions resulted in higher rates of utilitarian judgments compared to neutral facial expressions. Further, in replication, we found that individual change in moral acceptability ratings due to disgust priming was modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust, revealing a bi-directional function. Our second replication extended this result to show that the function held for both subliminally and consciously presented stimuli. Combined across these experiments, we show a reliable bi-directional function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments (i.e., number-based) and presentations to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments (i.e., rules-based). Our results may reconcile previous conflicting reports of disgust modulation of moral judgment by modeling how individual sensitivity to disgust determines the direction and degree of this effect.

Highlights

  • Moral conflict arises when an individual has the option of bringing about the greater good by taking an emotionally unappealing course of action

  • We show a reliable bi-directional function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments and presentations to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments

  • Combining samples A and B yielded a highly significant main effect [disgust: M = 2.63, SD = 0.45; neutral: (M = 2.46, SD = 0.39), t(50) = 3.75, p < 0.001, d = 0.53 (Figure 3A)]. To test whether this change represented a switch in the valence of subjects’ responses, we collapsed the 4-point responses into two bins: “acceptable” and “unacceptable.” We found that the mean proportion of questions to which subjects responded “acceptable” was significantly higher in the disgust group (56.47%) than the neutral group (49.80%), t(50) = 3.20, p < 0.01, d = 0.45

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Summary

Introduction

Moral conflict arises when an individual has the option of bringing about the greater good by taking an emotionally unappealing course of action. A classic laboratory illustration of a moral dilemma is the trolley-car scenario, in which one has the option of pushing a large person in front of an on-rushing trolley in order to save the lives of five people who are ahead of it on the tracks In philosophical terms, such a dilemma can be thought of as a decision between a deontological or utilitarian course of action; that is, abiding by a principle (e.g., “I should not actively cause harm to another person”) versus maximizing utility (e.g., saving the most lives). Situations such as the trolley-car dilemma have been used increasingly in psychological studies as a means of isolating the components of the moral decision-making process, and in elucidating the situational factors that may influence people’s choices

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