Abstract
Meu objetivo aqui é mostrar o quão fácil é lidar com o utilitarismo de preferências e maximizar a utilidade pessoal (ou animal) quando somos confrontados com um pequeno conjunto de ações possíveis. Uma vez que a reduzimos o escopo das ações possíveis, ou seja, ao que é factível, nós também nos tornamos facilmente capazes de identificar o comportamento adequado ou inadequado, ao menos em termos da maximização racional das preferências desejadas.
Highlights
What have we learned from this little exercise? My intention here is to show how easy it is to deal with preference utilitarianism and to maximize personal utility when we are faced with a small set of possible actions
Once we reduce the scope of possible actions, that is, what it is feasible to be done, we are able to identify the proper or improper conduct, at least in terms of rational maximization of desired prerefences
We accept this, in my view very modest, request, we can might feel that we have reason to trust some points regarding the possibility of learning morality in terms of right and wrong in the same way we learn physics in terms of right and wrong: When we are taught F=m.a, are we taught that F=m.a because our western culture says that F=m.a? Or do we say that F=m.a because we have reason to say that F=m.a in any circumstance within this reality which is, until now, the only one we know of?
Summary
Given the narrative of brain functionality we obtain in Churchland, we can conclude some things about the way in which he understands representations: Linguistic representation, in that sense, is conditioned by non-cognitive representations of physical interactions – and brain physiology can, within limits, already be identified as operating properly or improperly.
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