Abstract
This paper proposes a game-based model to conduct the issue of road congestion pricing. The ride comfort of travel modes, e.g., cars or buses, is introduced into the travel cost function of the traditional bottleneck model. Furthermore, based on different travel cost functions of various travel modes, the Nash equilibriums are achieved among the government and various travelers. The results can be employed to describe internality and externality of traffic system respectively. Finally, numerical examples are presented. The findings of our work indicate a relationship between the government’s goal and the charge rate and that the emergence of ride comfort obviously is a key determinant of travelers’ behavior.
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