Abstract
O artigo investiga se uma renda mínima assegurada pelo Estado (que não é a mesma coisa que uma renda básica) é uma condição necessária para que indivíduos (1) atinjam um patamar básico de autonomia e (2) desenvolvam “capabilidades” que os permitam incrementar a sua qualidade de vida. Como embasamento teórico para a minha análise, utilizarei a teoria do reconhecimento de Honneth, a abordagem de “capabilidade” de Sen (também na versão oferecida por Nussbaum) e o conceito de independência de Simmel, como foi desenvolvido em sua Filosofia do Dinheiro. A renda mínima visa garantir não só a sobrevivência dos extremamente pobres (isso também poderia ser realizado através de programas emergenciais), mas também – em cooperação com outros programas do Estado, tais como educação, assistência médica e jurídica etc – permitir que esses indivíduos sejam mais independentes do seu ambiente social, onde muitas vezes a dependência constitui um forte obstáculo ao desenvolvimento da sua autonomia. A inclusão social e política de milhões de pessoas, tanto em países em desenvolvimento quanto nos países pobres, depende da existência de tais programas.
Highlights
In his Struggle for Recognition Axel Honneth aims – among other things – at actualizing some fundamental intuitions that Hegel exposed in his writings from the Jena period (HONNETH 1992)
I’m referring to the question of the rising of an autonomous subject in a social dimension, which is on the one hand wider than the familiar one of the love relationship between mother and child, and which on the other hand has not directly to do with the legal dimension of the mutual recognition of individual rights
I’ll try to explore the open space lying between the recognition forms of Liebe and Recht in order to identify a further form of recognition, which is as essential as the mentioned ones and which concerns what Amartya Sen calls “capabilities”, Philippe van Parijs calls “real freedom” and Georg Simmel calls “independency”, and which I shall call “basic autonomy”
Summary
In his Struggle for Recognition Axel Honneth aims – among other things – at actualizing some fundamental intuitions that Hegel exposed in his writings from the Jena period (HONNETH 1992). While I agree with Honneth’s Hegelian stance according to which human beings generally develop their identities in an inter-subjective context and in a ‘healthy’ self-consciousness through recognition by others, I have the impression that in his description of the different forms of recognition (love, right, and solidarity) and of “practical self-relation” (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) Honneth is leaving something out He (and Hegel before him) is jumping from the intimate sphere of love relations (with the mother, with the family, with friends and lovers) to the public sphere of legal relations (with other rights bearers, with the State etc.). I shall start offering a broad definition of individual autonomy and I shall later try to refine this definition through reference to the different ways in which individuals can reach autonomy
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