Military Strategy

Abstract

Abstract From his experience under Truman as Army chief of staff, as ad hoc chairman of the JCS, and finally as SACEUR, Eisenhower had formed firm convictions regarding defense strategy, force structure, and budgeting. He had been dismayed by Truman’s inadequate defense spending before Korea, by the interservice feuding, and by the frenetic across-the-board buildup after the Korean invasion that resulted in a huge budget deficit and national security spending amounting to 13.8 percent of the GNP in FY 1953. In revising Truman’s FY 1954 budget, already discussed, Eisenhower applied several of his basic convictions. The pace of the buildup, he insisted, should be designed not to react to a fixed date of peak danger, but for an orderly development of defense forces capable of being maintained for an indefinite period of cold warthe long haul. Moreover, the level of defense spending should be sufficient to provide adequate security without damaging the economy, which was an essential component of long-term security. On the FY 1954 budget he satisfied these criteria (over the conflicting objections of Humphrey and the JCS) by savings in administration and support forces and deferring advance procurement, without cutting combat forces. Thus reform of the military strategy was not addressed. That would be done only during the second half of 1953 in conjunction with the drafting of the broad national security strategy.