Manifestations of Russian formal and informal strategies in Southern and Eastern Africa, 2000–2022

Abstract

ABSTRACT Russian-African relations have strengthened since Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia. This article argues that a strategy to consolidate power within ‘personalised autocracies’, characterised by co-dependent relationships between the ‘strongmen’ and political elites, shapes Russian foreign policy toward Africa. This strategy includes five elements: i) ‘debt-for-development’swaps; ii) nuclear technology exports; iii) military and para-military cooperation; iv) disinformation campaigns and elections meddling, and v) sponsorship for political parties. The article analyses the implementation of this strategy in Southern and Eastern Africa via the lens of the ‘Racket of Predatory Power’, and identifies three objectives: rent-control, weakened states, and legitimisation. Rent-seeking, the research suggests, is key to Russia’s strategy in these regions. However, the legitimising narrative that underpins Russian foreign policy towards Africa creates a false perception of positive public outcomes among African leaders and the general public arising from Russian-African cooperation.