Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy

Abstract

The paper studies Russia's Ukraine policy since the Orange Revolution. Russia's policy toward its western neighbor has evolved from unhappy relations with Victor Yushchenko to rapprochement with Victor Yanukovich and then confrontation over the revolutionary power change in Kiev in February 2014. The paper argues that Vladimir Putin's actions following February revolution in Kiev demonstrate both change and continuity in Russia's foreign policy. Although these actions constituted a major escalation, relative to Russia's previous behavior toward Ukraine, the escalation of relations with Kiev also reflected a broader policy pattern of Russia's assertive relations with the Western nations adopted by the Kremlin since the mid-2000s. What made Russia's conflict with Ukraine possible, even inevitable, was the West's lack of recognition for Russia's values and interests in Eurasia, on the one hand, and the critically important role that Ukraine played in the Kremlin's foreign policy calculations, on the other. The paper provides an empirically grounded interpretation of Russia's changing policy that emphasizes Russia–Ukraine–West interaction and a mutually reinforcing dynamics of their misunderstanding. It also addresses four alternative explanations of Russia's Ukraine policy and discusses several dangers and possible solutions to the crisis.