Abstract
I shall argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme – and ultimately unworkable – attempt to resolve this tension. Much about Malebranche’s theory of perception is controversial. There is one point, however, on which most commentators converge: Malebranche defends an adverbial theory of sensation. For there seems to be nothing in the external world for them to represent. If one takes representation to require resemblance, the pressure in this direction is even stronger. On the other hand, some sensations – particularly color sensations – seem to be required for us to have perceptual experiences of bodies. How else could one perceive, or perhaps even think about, the boundaries of a body, except in terms of different shadings of color? Sensations must, it seems, represent at least some features of the mind-independent world.
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