Malaysia in 1989: Communists End Armed Struggle

Abstract

The historic decision by the banned Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) to formally end its armed struggle to overthrow the Malaysian government was the focus of the political limelight in late 1989. While factionalism within the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant partner in the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN), the national front coalition, and within two of its junior partners persisted throughout the year, there is little doubt that the CPM's decision held perhaps the greatest political and psychological significance for Malaysians. More than 10,000 troops and civilians had been killed by the CPM, a predominantly ethnic Chinese revolutionary organization formed in 1930 to overthrow the Malayan (after 1957, Malaysian) authorities and set up a communist state. The 41-year armed struggle, which began in June 1948 against British colonial authorities and then against the independent government of Malaysia, ended symbolically on December 2 with the signing of an agreement by the CPM with both Malaysia and Thailand in the Thai border town of Haadyai. Indeed, even before this historic date the CPM, with its strength of around 1,200 armed guerrillas, was more of a nuisance than any serious threat to the Malaysian polity. Hence, the significance of the accord lies more in what the Malaysian government has done rather than what the communists have not done. Several factors account for the success of governmental efforts in wiping out the insurgency. The 12-year State of Emergency (1948-1960) declared against the CPM was continued in a different form through enactment of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1960. Although it eventually provided a convenient tool for the government to deal with any and every form of anti-governmental protest over the years, the ISA effectively denied the communists any overt, as well as covert opportunity to spread their ideol-