The Security Situation in Peninsular Malaysia

Abstract

At no time in the history of the communist insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly since the end of the first Emergency way back in 1960, has there been any event as sensational and mystifying as the disclosure in October 1974 of a major schism within the ranks of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). There was, indeed, a dramatic upsurge in terrorist and subversive activity extending over a fairly large area of the country in the twelve months preceding the disclosure, but the intrinsic significance of this development pales beside the revelation of an internal split within the CPM, the extent and seriousness of which are still not entirely clear. Notwithstanding the far-reaching implications of the CPM's internal problems, any assessment of the security situation in Peninsular Malaysia during the past twelve months must necessarily take into consideration the Communist Terrorist Organization's (CTO's) campaign to keep up the pace of the insurgency as well as the counter-measures taken by the Malaysian Government. This is aU the more appropriate in view of the somewhat sketchy nature of the official version of the split in the CPM; and it is still too early to indulge in excessive speculation about its actual consequences as the situation is in-a highly fluid state. Furthermore, the government's own successes against the CTO during the past year have received wide publicity and some understanding of their strategic value is imperative for an evaluation of the balance of forces in the internal security situation of Peninsular Malaysia.