Making War: The President and Congress

Abstract

Jefferson was already familiar with the Barbary situation. For centuries, these states had been running a racket of sorts against the European nations whose ships plied the Mediterranean's waters: capturing ships, enslaving seamen or holding them for ransom, and exacting tribute from European governments in return for a promise to refrain from such harassment. After United States independence, its ships no longer enjoyed British protection and several were captured. As United States ambassador to France during the 1780s, Jefferson tried unsuccessfully to secure the release of the crewmen of those ships. Moreover, he attempted to organize a multilateral naval force to police the Mediterranean from such piracy, but to no avail. Having no alternative, the United States thus followed European practice and negotiated treaties with the four Barbary states calling for annual tributary payments. When Tripoli declared war on the United States, in hope of a higher rate of payment, President Jefferson decided that the United States had had enough. He dispatched four ships of the United States Navy to protect American shipping in the area, but-in the absence of any congressional authorization-ordered them to take only defensive measures. When Congress reconvened that fall, he asked for specific authority to prosecute the war more vigorously, which he promptly received. The combined action of the United States Navy and Marines forced Tripoli to sue for peace in 1805, and by 1830, the Barbary pirates had been driven from the sea.'