Abstract

To the question “Are we as humans obliged to something because it is good, or because it is prescribed by God?”, the Christian Church father Tertullian answered: we obey because of God's will. Today, many are inclined to give the first answer, and even to distrust people who follow Tertullian. In this article, however, the author demonstrates the continuing relevance of Tertullian’s paradigm about reason/will in modern political philosophy: for example, in Thomas Hobbes’ “decisionist” maxim: not truth, but the will of formal authority establishes the law. Or in the democratic combination of rational discussion and decisive majority will. This gives modern democracy the character of a ritual instead of a rational machinery: a kind of secular divine judgement. Also another issue allows us to demonstrate the lasting actuality of Tertullian’s paired concepts: the issue that a political community not only needs democratic legitimacy, but also national unity. Here also the relationship with the question of violence becomes relevant. The author presents four “dangerous liaisons” between love and rational justice. The basic intuition here is that we “not only want to live in a world which we are able to consider just, but in a reality which we experience as valuable in and of itself” (Paul W. Kahn). Love can strengthen rational justice, and vice versa; love can get in conflict with justice; justice can try to expand itself at the expensive of love; and – the other way around – love can drive us to the universal and transcend legal boundaries. As a conclusion, we can distinguish clearly between nationalism and patriotism. And second, we must admit that, while love will always destabilize law, the opposite is also true: we have to make calculations, so that justice can also destabilize love.

Highlights

  • Another issue allows us to demonstrate the lasting actuality of Tertullian’s paired concepts: the issue that a political community needs democratic legitimacy, and national unity

  • Love can strengthen rational justice, and vice versa; love can get in conflict with justice; justice can try to expand itself at the expensive of love; and – the other way around – love can drive us to the universal and transcend legal boundaries

  • To a jurist of the decisionist type, we read in Schmitt, “not the precept as precept, but the authority or sovereignty of a last decision given as command is the source of all ‘law’, that is, of all norms and prescriptions which follow from it.”[4]. It is in this context that he quotes Tertullian, not without adding that this theologian cannot be considered a decisionist

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Summary

Tertullian’s model: reason and will

In his catechetical writing De paenitentia (203/204), the Carthaginian jurist and Christian theologian Tertullian (ca. 160–220) makes the following statement: “We as humans are not obliged to something because it is good, but because it is prescribed by God”.1 To us, formed by science and humanism, such a sentence has become incomprehensible, it is nothing less than a provocation. Triumphalism and minorities are able to – within determined procedural limits – continue cherishing the hope that the law may yet one day be amended in their favour.[17] For these reasons, amongst others the German political thinker Hermann Lübbe defends the “decisionist” moment in modern democracy against Jürgen Habermas, according to whom, within the play of democracy, the “power of the compelling argument” ought to always gain the upper hand. I am myself of the opinion that, against the current tendency of many European political parties demanding cultural homogeneity and moral consensus, we need to hold high the classical-liberal freedom to deviate: we should embrace, not deplore the fact that ratio and voluntas do not coincide: auctoritas, non veritas

Love and law
Love and law: four dangerous liaisons and collisions
Love against law
Love which transcends legal boundaries

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