Limitations on Structural Principles of Distributive Justice: The Case of Discrete Idiosyncratic Goods

Abstract

Part V features analyses of justice conceptions and processes in resource exchange. In Chap. 22, Richard Galvin and Charles Lockhart distinguish among types of goods which have significant implications for theories of distributive justice. They provide a general account of two sets of properties on the bases of which goods can be distinguished: fungibility versus nonfungibility and divisibility versus indivisibility. Further, they contend that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice (i.e., principles such as maximin that distribute payoffs to positions). As an example Galvin and Lockhart consider James Fishkin’s (Fishkin, J. S. (1983). Justice, equal opportunity and the family. New Haven: Yale University Press.) discussion of structural principles, arguing that his view (1) that value, structure, and assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible and divisible, (2) that structural principles face difficulties beyond those which Fishkin (Fishkin, J. S. (1979). Tyranny and legitimacy: A critique of political theories. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.) identifies and addresses with his principle of nontyranny, since structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods, and (3) that these difficulties can be managed through the application of a value-sensitivity proviso. The authors show that two important goods, medical care and advanced education, are highly nonfungible and indivisible and thus support the distinctions drawn earlier. Finally, they specify the nature of complementary contributions as well as coordination problems between structural principles and the value-sensitivity proviso in their application to distributive justice issues.